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7With a string of domestic and external crises the year 2009 has clearly shown how fragile and 
illusory have the economic growth and modernisation been in Moldova in the last decade. The 
expected GDP decline will get Moldova three years back; capital investments have fallen at path 
not seen since early 1990s; economic confi dence is at historical lows, while the public fi nance has 
been fundamentally undermined. Although global fi nancial crisis has its part of blame, Moldova is 
also a victim of the blundering political irresponsibility.
The Governmental change in September 2009 brings new hopes, but it should be clear that these 
expectations should not be overblown. Although the reshuﬄ  e of the ministers was necessary 
it is not suﬃ  cient to change the modus operandi of the ministries.  The administrative system is 
subject to its own logic and inertia. The real challenge for the new Government will be to push 
forward a new logical framework under which policy is being developed and implemented. 
Political uncertainty and diﬃ  cult negotiations within the governing coalition compounds this task 
still more.
New Governmental program emphasizes the idea of economic competitiveness and attractiveness. 
Moreover, the Government is very well position to start an ambitious set of reforms since many 
of its members have an extensive business experience.  Republic of Moldova is poised to remain 
a small and open economy for the foreseeable future, save some dramatic shifts in the regional 
geopolitical landscape. Therefore, in order to thrive in good times and weather out better the bad 
ones, Moldovan economy should be competitive abroad and attractive inside. For this purpose, the 
new Government should forcefully push forward a comprehensive institutional reform agenda. 
The barriers for business development should be dismantled, while public administration trimmed 
and modernized. We believe that this Government should aim at establishing the best business 
environment in Central and Eastern Europe. There is a lot of good international experience to 
learn from in this respect. Such a task is ambitious but feasible provided that the Government 
remains politically stable and accountable. 
This reform process should pave the wave for negotiation of the new political agreement with 
EU as well as starting the talks on conclusion of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
between EU and Moldova. For the new Government the consistency should become the key 
word; it was missing from the activity of the previous government and this very fact made the 
promises of reforms, both in and out of Moldova, sound empty. Thus, the new Government has 
to show that it is diﬀ erent both to external and local partners (business, civil society, general 
public).
The new Government should also strategically approach impacts the global markets have on 
economic and social development in Moldova. As a net commodity importer Moldova should 
rationalize its dependencies through becoming more eﬃ  cient user of those. At the same time 
opportunities emerging from new development trends should be carefully analyzed with respect 
to country’s ability to benefi t from them. In this context, the policy action should aim at making 
domestic economy to be among the fi rst to benefi t from such “fl ashes” of things to come.
Key policy messages in MEGA#2
8Economic governance
The previous Government has, to put it simply, mismanaged the impact of the global fi nancial 
crisis. Guided only by its narrow electoral interests, the previous Government postponed a 
number of vital reforms and necessary adjustments to the public budget. Because of this, 
the new Government will have to demonstrate double eﬃ  ciency when dealing with the 
consequences of the crisis in 2009 and beyond. Among the fi rst actions undertaken by the 
current Government was the development of the Program for Economic Stabilization and 
Revival of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-2011. The document expresses a clear analysis 
of the economic situation and is focused on three priorities: public fi nance stabilization, 
resumption of economic growth and ensuring an eﬃ  cient and fair social protection. Gathering 
the necessary resources for its implementation is the real problem yet to be solved. Agreeing 
on a preliminary memorandum with the IMF with quite advantageous conditions has been a 
real success for the Government as it paves the way for additional and more targeted support 
from other donors. But it has to be clear that no money will be transferred to Moldova before 
the domestic political instability is settled. The key challenge for the Government is to ensure 
an eﬃ  cient use (read investment) of the external resources that agreement with IMF can 
unlock rather than to use them for current expenditures. Unfortunately, temptations can 
be high unless political crisis is overcome and the current Government has a clear long-term 
mandate and political support for action. 
GDP decline
Although Moldova has not been the most severely hit country in the region by the global 
economic crisis with a decline of 7.8% in the fi rst semester 2009, the real impact was much 
stronger taking into consideration the potential growth if no crisis had occurred. Because 
of the crisis, the real (as opposed to the visible) GDP decline from the forecasted potential 
GDP is 15.1% in the fi rst semester. The main drivers of decline are decreasing consumption 
that reacted already in 2008 to the global evolutions; decreasing capital investments due to 
the economic, but also political crisis in Moldova that aﬀ ected the most foreign investments; 
and decrease in foreign demand that resulted in a severe industrial recession which had the 
most major contribution do the GDP decline as compared with other production sectors. As 
these trends will not change by the end of the year we expect an economic decline between 
8 and 11% in 2009 and a slight recovery of up to 1% in 2010. However it will not be an immediate 
reaction to the recovery of Moldovan trade partners as the contracts between many partner-
companies have been voided and many companies in Moldova have been or are being 
liquidated. Thus, the major role of the Government in reaching economic growth will be to 
support consumption, among others through decreasing artifi cially high prices resulted from 
anti-market arrangements, and to increase the country’s attractiveness after the too long 
period of political instability.
S u m m a r y
9Agriculture
The crops output in 2009 will decline by about 18-19% while livestock production is likely to put 
an 8% growth. Neither the fi rst one nor the second indicators are anything of special. Crops 
production declined so much after a spectacular growth in 2008, while the livestock is only 
recovering from the 2007 drought blow. We expect a rather bleak growth of the agricultural 
output of 1.7-2.5% for 2010. Small quantities of harvested cereals are the main reason of falling 
agricultural production, which was to some extent moderated by improved yields of some 
high-value crops (vegetables, fruits, grapes). Falling prices has been the main concern for the 
farmers, even though it should be added that to some extent farmers are victims of their 
own price myopia and lack of investment coordination. Improved quality of cereals has not 
compensated enough the quantitative losses. Meat producers have been fortunate in 2009 
by stable or even increasing prices, but this has not been the case of milk producers, with 
the prices collapsing by 1/3 in some instances. New Government has completely changed 
the agricultural policy philosophy by abandoning “land consolidation” mantra and adopting 
more relevant goals of enhancing sector’s competitiveness and making full use of country’s 
agricultural resources. However, we believe that a key precondition for the new policy 
implementation is a radical institutional restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Industry which in past 7-8 years has acted as an agency implementing political orders from 
the Presidency rather than designing meaningful policy. The reformed Ministry will have to 
put a lot of resources to ensure adequate training of the farmers in order to reduce the yields 
volatility. It will also have to contribute to reducing price volatility by market interventions, 
price forecasts and other tools, but here clearly the producers associations will have a bigger 
role in horizontal coordination. 
Industry and infrastructure
Moldovan industrial sector entered the year 2009 already being shackled by a series of shocks. 
With some positive yet rather feeble signs of emerging in October-November, we believe that 
the most optimist scenario for 2009 is a 20% decline in industrial output and this will be one 
the deepest decline of industrial production in Europe and CIS. For 2010 we expect a positive 
5-6% growth, not enough to speak even of a recovery. Change in government has brought 
also some changes in industrial policy rhetoric and practice. The new Government puts 
more emphasis on technological competitiveness of the Moldovan companies and on more 
competent human resources and managers. The issue of quality of corporate management in 
industrial sector is a special one. As Doing Business 2010 prove, the legislation in Moldova does 
not held executive directors responsible to their shareholders, be they private or public, which 
results in extreme managerial ineﬃ  ciency and assets funnelling. The dramatic involution of 
the Moldovan industrial sector is ultimately explained by the managers’ incapacity in adapting 
their companies to new market realities posed by the crisis and their exaggerate expectations 
regarding state support. As preliminary fi nancial results for 2009 show, state-owned 
enterprises have been particularly ineﬃ  cient during the crisis. For the state-owned property 
to be eﬃ  ciently used in the economy, it is highly necessary that the Government either adopts 
more severe standards of management of state owned enterprises or restructures/privatizes 
these companies. Another issue of real concern is ineﬃ  ciency of market regulatory agencies. 
Many of them have been prisoners of political or vested interests in the last years. As the 
Ministry of Economy is not able to “pilot” indefi nitely long economic sectors, it is necessary 
that these agencies are eﬀ ectively empowered and trusted by the Government and better 
controlled by the Parliament.
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Investments and constructions
In 2009 the capital investment has collapsed by 45% as compared with 2008. Such rates of 
investment decline can be found only in Moldovan statistical yearbooks of the turbulent early 
1990s. Financial crisis has certainly had the main contribution to this, but many companies were 
also frightened by the political violence in April and subsequent political turmoil. The foreign 
direct investment shrunk around 9-fold in the fi rst half of 2009. As for the domestic investment, 
it ultimately has contracted because of the high interest rates for the long-term banking loans, 
shallow domestic capital market and lack of companies’ own fi nancial resources; and all these 
combined with general economic pessimism. The 40% contraction of the construction-assembly 
works – representing more than half of total capital during the last years – has been the main 
structural factor of the investment decline. At fi rst sight, with the real estate market overblown 
in the recent years, such a contraction would not be seen as anything more than a necessary 
cold shower. However, the real risk is related to the fact that the domestic banks have buried 
a lot of money in the constructions sector (15% of total loans) and presently this market is in a 
systemic crisis. Falling real estate prices serves as a rude awakening for construction companies, 
developers and banks.
Services
Services sector has proven to be the most resilient under the current economic recession. Even 
though the current year began with a signifi cant contraction of many services sub-sectors, in 
the second part of the year the situation improved. After a moderate decline of 2-3% that is 
likely to be registered in 2009, we expect that in 2010 volume of services will rise 3%. In 2009 the 
transport sector has been the most heavily hit by the global fi nancial crisis, with freighted goods 
contracting 3 times in a only couple of months. Positive development in the tourism sector came 
as a positive surprise, and despite the crisis Moldovans continued to prefer Turkish, Bulgarian 
and Romanian resorts to the domestic ones. This is a positive sign in the context of the on-going 
fi nancial crisis; another one is the rising volume of services rendered to population. However for 
the consumers to buy more services it is imperative to ensure a fair, market-set, level of prices and 
a good protection of consumers’ rights. The new Government’s business-friendly tone has not 
been matched by a similar attitude regarding the consumers’ rights. As EU practices suggest, an 
Agency for Consumers Protection is just as important as the Agency for Competition Promotion.
Labour market
The global fi nancial crisis has exerted a signifi cant impact on domestic labour market in Moldova. 
Diminishing demand resulted in a reduced supplied of goods and services and therefore in 
worsening of the labourers’ situation. While the reported average wage has increased by 7-8% 
in real times in 2009, this does not refl ect an improved situation of the employees, because of 
rising wage arrears and decreasing employment. According to our estimates in 2009 about 80 
thousand of the people lost their jobs because of the crisis. Employment rate has reached record 
low levels of 39%, which is seems be the lowest in the region. It is also historically the lowest 
level ever achieved in Moldova in the last 20 years. Worsening pessimism is refl ected also by the 
growing number of discouraged people, i.e. those that do not even look for jobs because they are 
afraid will not fi nd in any case. Under normal conditions, we should expect about 8-9 thousand 
people per year to enter this category; because of the crisis their number is likely to exceed 25 
thousand in 2009. The global fi nancial crisis has also taken many Moldovan migrants back to 
Moldova where jobs are missing as well; this infl ow of human resource only worsens even more 
the diﬃ  cult situation on the domestic labour market. We have seen this infl ow in the fi rst quarter 
of the year, but afterwards people this eﬀ ect was not so visible: people came back home, did not 
fi nd any jobs and get back abroad, eventually with changed destination country.
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Households’ income
The overall income of the population has decreased in 2009, with a deeper decline in the second 
quarter: 2% compared to 0.2% in the fi rst quarter. However, diﬀ erent sources of income followed 
diﬀ erent paths. Remittances has decline the most, with a huge diﬀ erence in data reported in 
Balance of Payments and in Household Budget Survey, not only in values but also in trends. 
This refl ects the problem of reporting of remittances in the Balance of Payments, where also 
investments and payments for goods and service provided from Moldova are included, which 
actually decreased prior to the decrease in real remittances used by households for consumption. 
Also, despite the increase in the average wage reported by the NBS, household real revenues from 
salaries have decreased. The budgetary revenues collected from taxation of salaries decreased 
and are much lower than in the previous period, denoting the delays in the wage payments and/
or the forced unpaid leaves. Only social payments have increased, mainly due to the increase 
in pensions in the beginning of April in the context of upcoming elections. As the recovery of 
most of the countries is expected in 2010 a slight increase in remittance of about 5% may be 
also expected. At the same time, the wages will remain stable except the wages of the teaching 
staﬀ  in the budgetary sector and in the service and industrial sectors where salaries are strongly 
correlated with the labour productivity.
Households’ consumption and savings
Consumption was the fi rst macroeconomic indicator testifying the presence of the economic 
crisis in Moldova. It has decreased even before the decrease in remittance and other incomes 
of the population, and this was shortly after the fi rst signs of global economic crisis emerged 
in September 2008. This proves that, as opposed to the previous Government, population was 
aware of the upcoming crisis and expected a decrease in income. Mirroring the consumers’ 
frugality, population savings in form of deposits in the commercial banks continued to increase 
until April 2009 despite the decrease in remittances. Since April the rate of growth has decreased 
signifi cantly and the bankruptcy of a Moldovan commercial bank in June 2009 made population 
more cautious in storing up money in banks for a while. However, already in August, a slight 
increase in deposits of natural persons there was registered again. Still, decreasing consumption 
and signifi cant negative growth rates for retail trade and of services provided to the population 
in October, despite the second year of crisis point to a decrease in consumption of over 10% by 
the end of the year. As consumption is one of the main elements of GDP it is very important to 
support it by fi scal measures that the Government avoided so far (a decrease of VAT for some 
goods and services, such as deduction from taxes of investments in durable goods of natural 
persons).
Prices
After many years of high infl ation for the fi rst time since independence Moldova has registered 
a signifi cant -2.3% annual defl ation in January-August 2009. However, in September the defl ation 
trend reversed and the next two months Moldova registered high rates of monthly infl ation. 
The new price surge was determined the growing production costs as revealed by the Industrial 
Prices Index that has been growing since March. Also, reversal of defl ation trend in most of the 
European countries made the imported goods more expensive again. An administrative increase 
in tariﬀ s for transport services and some utilities in Chisinau in October fuelled the infl ation spike. 
2009 will probably end with an annual infl ation between 0% and 1%. For 2010 our expectations are 
more negative, with an end-year annual infl ation of 4-5% to come as result of increased oil prices 
and economic recovery.
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Monetary policy 
Since September 2008 the central bank’s monetary policy became more focused on stimulation 
the economic growth. However, despite the central bank’s attempts to lose its monetary 
policy, the gap between its policy rate and annual infl ation increased. Surprisingly, the defl ation 
undermined the eﬃ  ciency of the monetary policy, leading to a decrease in economy monetization 
and credits volume oﬀ ered by commercial banks. Following the same objective, stimulation of 
the economic growth, the central bank started to rely more intensively on liquidity providing 
operations and since April 2009 sterilisation operations have not been used any more. Two 
monetary policy instruments were used in this direction: REPO operations and direct loans to 
commercial banks. The depreciation of national currency since beginning of 2009 was caused 
both by objective factors (decrease in foreign currency infl ows as a result of the decrease in 
exports, remittances and FDIs), as well as by downwards anticipations of investors. Increased 
demand for foreign currency made the central bank to conduct massive interventions on the 
foreign exchange market in order to prevent the national currency from a steep depreciation.
Budgetary and fi scal policy
The public budget in Moldova felt the fi rst crisis repercussions of the global crisis back in 
October 2008, when the annual indicators of budgetary revenues registered a sluggish decline. 
A sharper deterioration of the budgetary position followed in 2009. As indirect taxes form the 
main source of budgetary revenues, the decrease in domestic consumption and, respectively, in 
imports represented the main cause of budgetary contraction. Besides the economic constraints 
aﬀ ecting the state budget, the Governmental electoral myopia served as another major factor 
which deepened the budgetary defi cit. It led to a critical situation which made the previous and 
current Government to rely intensively on internal borrowings by issuing state treasury bills. Due 
to the fact that the maturities of these loans are short, such form of fi nancing can be used only for 
covering some temporary cash defi cits. The current budgetary defi cit determines the necessity 
for an austere budgetary policy which will be promoted until the end of the current year and 
during 2010 and even beyond. A major policy challenge will be therefore to ensure a synergy 
between the tight budgetary policy and economic growth.
Financial sector
In 2009 all fi nancial markets- including capital and insurance markets - have suﬀ ered because of 
the global fi nancial crisis. However, main concerns are related to the evolution of the commercial 
banks which form the main pillar of the domestic fi nancial system. Even though domestic 
commercial banks were not highly entrenched in loans agreement with Western fi nancial 
institutions, Moldovan banks have suﬀ ered because of the declining infl ows of currency from 
migrants, investors and exporters. They have been also victims of lower public trust, and the 
ordered liquidation of a commercial bank has only added to the public anxiety.
Foreign trade
The global fi nancial meltdown had some serious impacts on the Moldovan foreign trade in 2009, 
as both exports and imports dramatically fell in the aftermath of the crisis. This fall underscored 
the high degree of exposure of domestic economy to the external risks, magnifi ed by the lack 
of an adequate response on the policy level. These dramatic eﬀ ects, however, did not change 
the course Moldovan exports were following: their drift towards EU market continued. This re-
orientation occurred at the surprising background of slumping Russia at the top of destinations 
for Moldovan exports. The oft-cited culprit is political animosity ensued in the wake of the April 
elections; although, an attentive glance at the structure of Moldovan exports to Romania might 
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oﬀ er more sound explanation. The imports spiralled downwards as well, as both consumers and 
companies started scaling back their expenses. Besides the newly found frugality of consumers, 
the cheapening petrol imports also added to the overall decline in imports. 
Global markets
After the steep decline in the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, main commodities found 
themselves on a fi rmer ground further in the year. Starting March-February, oil, metals and food 
commodities set on the rebound of diﬀ erent degrees. The rebound was helped by signifi cant 
monetary stimuli applied by the governments of leading economies as well as by some supply-
side policies of commodity producers, as in the case of OPEC or big western metal producers. 
If the current economic recovery does not prove a false dawn the global economy is set for a 
lasting rebound in commodity prices that might aim at reaching again the peaks of 2008. The 
more expensive commodities do not bode well for Moldovan economy as these inputs will most 
probably translate into more expensive and less competitive end-products.
14
This chapter discusses the main reforms included in the new Government’s agenda, and evaluates 
its crisis management program. It also includes a brief analysis on Moldova’s evolution in the World 
Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rating, highlighting the main positive and negative trends in the 
business climate. The 2009 year has brought about a new beginning in Moldova’s relations with IMF, 
which is also described in this chapter. Finally, the chapter states our anticipation regarding the 2010 
year and the main economic challenges for this period. 
Analysis of the key aspects of the governmental program
Since mid 2008 the economic governance in Moldova was infl uenced by three types of 
constraints: 
Electoral constraints, which made the Government to postpone some painful reforms 
and to emphasize its populist stance in order to gain more political dividends for the 
April 2009 elections; 
Economic constraints, which undermined the Government’s fi nancial ability to sustain 
its promises made before April 2009 elections; and
Political constraints, which aﬀ ected the Government’s institutional capacity to 
implement the necessary reforms aimed at mitigating the economic crisis eﬀ ects. 
A number of economic and political constraints continue to infl uence the activity of the new 
Government sworn in on 25 of September 2009. The new governmental agenda (its title is 
“European Integration: Freedom, Democracy and Wellbeing”) includes many of the reforms 
started by the previous Government; however it contains also conceptually new approaches 
to their implementation. Additionally it emphasizes the administrative decentralization reform 
which was not considered as a real priority by the previous Government. The main barriers 
impeding this reform are the low fi nancial autonomy of the local governments and the poor 
quality of local institutions. Therefore, the administrative decentralization reform should be part 
of a bigger package including fi scal decentralization reform, local public administration reform 
and a territorial-administrative rationalization of the country.
The Governmental program also identifi es the social assistance and social insurance reform among 
its main priorities. The actions planned in this respect do not diﬀ er conceptually from those in 
the previous Government’s agenda. For instance, both refer to the necessity to switch the social 
protection system from nominative compensations to means-tested system. A fundamental 
challenge related to the social insurance system is that the current public pensions system is 
fi nancially not sustainable. The new Government, as the previous one, plans to reform the public 
pillar of the pension system (PAYG), by unifying the pensions system, eliminating unwarranted 
benefi ts for some categories of employees and developing a multi-pillar pensions system. The new 
Government seems to be more determined than the previous one to introduce the 2nd mandatory 
pillar in the pension system. However, the current Government may commit the same mistake 
as the previous one: it is inclined to increase the replacement rate while maintaining the current 
pensions’ indexation procedure (with pensions indexation coeﬃ  cient calculated as average of 
the Consumer Price Index and the growth rate of the average wage). In such circumstances, 
the replacement rate will continue to decrease since the wage growth rate, usually, exceeds the 
infl ation level which, by default, makes the pensions growing slower than the wages. Thus, a 
?
?
?
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sustainable increase in replacement rate can be achieved only after a reformation of the actual 
PAYG system and the development of the multi-pillar pensions system. 
The new Government is very well positioned to start more aggressively elimination of bureaucratic 
barriers for companies and to ensure fair competition on the market. In this respect, the 
Governmental program stresses the importance of diminishing the number of economic activities 
subject to licensing, elimination of foreign trade restrictions and other administrative barriers. It 
also includes the Government’s commitment to diminish the state’s abusive intervention in the 
activity of enterprises. A distinct priority is promise of supporting the development of Small and 
Medium Enterprises which conveys a positive message to the country’s business community. 
From anti-crisis mismanagement to post-crisis management
As of end of September 2009 the industrial production index registered 75.9% in comparison with 
the previous year, fi xed capital investments – 57.5%, while those fi nanced from foreign resources 
– 35.5%, construction works – 63.6%, volume of goods transported – 40.8%. Additionally, in the 
fi rst semester 2009 the GDP dropped by 7.8% and the budgetary defi cit increased to 7.2% of GDP. 
The dramatic economic situation that these indicators reveal is not just an eﬀ ect of the world 
economic crisis, but also a result of the lack of any anti-crisis management from the part of the 
previous Government. Its reluctance to undertake unpopular anti-crisis measures was determined 
by electoral objectives. At this stage, lack of anti-crisis management program on behalf of the 
previous Government should be compensated by a more eﬃ  cient post-crisis management 
program on behalf of the current one. 
Developing a Program for Economic Stabilization and Revival of the Republic of Moldova for 
2009-2011 has been among the fi rst actions undertaken by the current Government. The Program 
is based on three fundamental priorities: public fi nance stabilization, consolidation of economic 
activity and promoting an eﬃ  cient and fair social protection system. It contains a series of 
unpopular measures requiring an austere budgetary policy to be promoted by the Government 
in the next 2-3 years. 
The most painful measures aimed at stabilization of public fi nances are focused on diversifi cation 
of public revenues fi nancing sources (with increases in excises for some goods, such as luxury 
cars, tobacco, cosmetics, alcoholic beverages, and fuels) and decrease in non-priority public 
expenditures with the purpose to decrease the budgetary defi cit. Among these there is the 
optimization of the number of public servants in central public authorities, elimination of 
unfulfi lled vacancies from public institutions, increase in the dormitory accommodation fees paid 
by students, elimination of many facilities for distinct categories of employees (especially those 
in police, customs, and military). 
These unpopular actions are somewhat counterbalanced by more popular reforms, such as 
the liberalization of export and import operations for economic agents, elimination of many 
bureaucratic barriers in obtaining licenses and permits, decrease or elimination the VAT for 
construction services, facilitation of the access to crediting resources, reduction of state controls 
on economic activity, simplifi cation of the fi scal reporting procedures and many others. 
Generally, the current Government’s post-crisis management is liberal in its approach, but at the 
same time it promotes orientation of more public resources from social to economic areas. Its 
assumption is that the consolidation of the positive economic growth will be mainly based on 
stimulation of aggregate supply, rather than aggregate demand. This new approach to crisis 
management is determined by increasing budgetary constraints and ineﬃ  cient social protection 
policy. These constraints have made the current Government’s to rely more on external fi nancing 
sources. Thus, a part of the budgetary defi cit is planned to be fi nanced from an IMF credit, while 
most of the infrastructural projects are supposed to be fi nanced with the foreign creditors’ and 
donors’ support.
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However, there are two weak aspects of this program that have to be further worked:
1) Unclear sources of fi nancing. The Government announced that the overall cost of this program 
is 10 billion MDL. It is clear that these funds will be not possible to be channelled from domestic 
resources. For this reason, the Government will have to be very persuasive during its forthcoming 
meeting with international donors (scheduled to take place in Brussels in early 2010).
2) Lack of an action plan and of a clear division of responsibilities among relevant public authorities. 
The program does neither specify who will be responsible for the implementation of its measures, 
nor how will they be implemented. As a result, it is not clear how some of the most costly measures 
will be achieved (e.g. stimulation of mortgage crediting, governmental acquisition of unfi nished 
real estate). 
Dialogue with IMF 
Because of the deep crisis impact, in the next 2-3 years external economic support will play a 
fundamental role for the economic, social and even political stabilization of Moldova. Therefore, 
consolidation of the relations with IMF, World Bank and European fi nancing organizations should 
be a priority for the recently invested Government. 
In October 2009 Moldova has agreed with the IFM on a new policy memorandum. The importance 
of the new memorandum was determined more by the necessity to fi nance the budgetary 
defi cit rather than by consolidation of the Central Bank’s oﬃ  cial reserve assets (which is the 
usual destination of IMF funds). Additionally, the memorandum with IMF is important because it 
enhances Moldova’s credibility for other Western and Eastern potential investors, creditors and 
donors which may provide funds for many infrastructural projects. 
The Moldovan Government entered the negotiations with IMF facing a series of major constraints 
as revealed, foremost, by the increasing budgetary defi cit spiking from 1% of GDP at the end of 
2008 to 7.4% in the fi rst semester of 2009, whereas for the IMF the maximum acceptable limit 
is 3%. These constraints generated negative expectations in the civil society, fuelled by political 
declarations of some representatives of the previous Government, related to the conditions they 
asserted the IMF would insist on to be incorporated in the new memorandum (increase in VAT, 
depreciation of national currency, cut in wages and pensions etc). 
However, the new Government proved to be quite eﬃ  cient in negotiations with IMF and, as a 
result, a preliminary agreement regarding a new fi nancing program was reached for a period 
of three years (2010-2012). The total credit amount will range between USD 580-600 million, 
however the fi nal decision will be made in January, 2010. Part of the credit will be based on the 
Extended Credit Facility (ECF), with an annual interest rate of 0.25% and another part is based on 
Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) which implies a higher interest rate, depending on the IMF policy 
rate. The credit duration for ECF is 10 years, while for SBA - 5 years. With IMF not insisting on 
tough conditionalities and committed to disburse an additional allocation of USD 180 million 
until the end of the current year for fi nancing the budgetary defi cit, the deal with IMF can be 
considered as an important success for Moldova. The next tranches will be disbursed provided 
that the Moldovan Government maintains the budget defi cit below 9% for 2009 and decreases it 
to 5% in 2010 and 3% in 2011. It is clear as well that if the political instability spirals up, no funds will 
be disbursed from any creditor or donor.
In any case, the Government will have to gather more domestic resources, and in this respect 
a number of excises are set to increase in 2010: excises for fuels by 7.5%, tobacco – 10%, luxury 
cars – 20%, alcoholic beverages – 4%, cosmetics – 15%. Also, it has to continue optimizing the 
public service, including decreasing the number of staﬀ  positions by 4000 units. The Government 
managed to avoid politically unacceptable conditions, related to the increase in VAT, decrease 
in pensions and wages for public workers and reintroduction of the corporate income tax in 
2010. However, we believe that some necessary measures cannot be postponed for long, such as 
increase in pensions’ age and setting a fairer income tax for corporate and personal income.
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Learning from Doing Business 2010
The World Bank report “Doing Business 2010” published in September 2009 revealed an 
important progress that Moldova achieved: it advanced from 103rd place in 2008 to 94th 
place in 2009 in the ranking of 183 countries. This has narrowed somewhat the gap between 
Moldova and the regional average1 that has increased only 4 positions, from 76 to 72. As shown 
in Chart 1, Moldova scored the most signifi cant progresses in registering property (from 50th 
place in 2008 to 17th in 2009), mainly due to the reduction of the time necessary to perform 
the procedures (from 48 days to 5 days) as result of the State Land Register reform. Another 
positive change is related to paying taxes (from 123rd to 101st), due to reduction of the number 
of procedures and time necessary for fi scal administration, as well as due to the lessening fi scal 
pressure. Additionally, Moldova went up 12 positions in starting a business, due to the decrease 
in duration of necessary procedures (from 15 days to 10 days), their number and costs. These 
positive evolutions were determined mainly by the (partial) implementation of the second 
phase of “guillotine” regulatory reform. 
At the same time a signifi cant regress was registered in employing workers (from 119 in 2008 to 141 in 
2010), dealing with construction permits (from 158 to 161), trading across borders (from 135 to 140), 
protecting investors (from 104 to 109), closing the business (from 88 to 90), getting credit (from 
84 to 87) and enforcing contracts (from 17 to 22). These evolutions reveal the chronic institutional 
problems aﬀ ecting Moldova’s business climate: corruption, excessive bureaucratization, and high 
cost of capital, which should be of priority for the current Government.
Chart 1 Changes in the Doing Business rating 2010/2009 for Moldova and for the region, 
positions in the rating
Source: www.doingbusiness.org
1 We defi ne this region as composed of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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Outlook for 2010
The year 2010 is likely to mark the end of the economic recession in Moldova and 
to come with a nil-to-moderately positive economic growth. However, this will 
directly depend on the political situation in the country and the ability of the current 
Government to implement its post-crisis management program.
Despite the planned increase in excises for alcohol, tobacco, luxury cars, perfumes 
and other products, this measure will not have dramatic eﬀ ects on the internal 
demand. First of all, these products have low price elasticity and their consumption 
will not go down signifi cantly. Secondly, the main factor aﬀ ecting the domestic 
demand during the current economic crisis is remittances. We believe that the 
increase in excises should have been accompanied by a reduction in VAT for 
selected products which would stimulate households’ consumption – the key for 
resumption of the economic growth in Moldova in short term. 
In 2009 the Moldovan economy has been hit not only by fi nancial crisis but also 
by the domestic political turmoil. Political stabilization and more friendly business 
environment are necessary to unblock many investment projects postponed for the 
reasons of political uncertainty. In this respect, the improvement of relations with 
Romania is very positive sign coming at the right time. Despite economic diﬃ  culties 
that the two countries face, this will signifi cantly strengthen their investment and 
trade relations in 2010.
We expect that a number of amendments and new laws will be adopted in 2010 to 
reduce the bureaucratic pressure on the constructions sector. This will make the 
activity in this sector more profi table, but also it will improve signifi cantly Moldova’s 
position in the international business and competitiveness ratings. This is important 
not only as formal prestige, but also as important public communication tool to 
attract more international investors and transnational companies in Moldova.
Challenges ahead
The more austere budgetary policy in 2010 bears the risk of social exclusion of some 
vulnerable segments of the population. In order to avoid this, the social protection 
reform should be fi nished as soon as possible, so that it gets better targeted and less 
cumbersome for the state budget. So far, we have not seen a clear exit strategy 
from the previous system.
Given the Government’s commitment to cut 4000 units of public servants, this 
politically painful measure can be easier accepted and understood socially if 
accompanied by a decrease in bureaucratization and improvement in public 
services supplied. Therefore, this reform must be implemented in line with the 
public service reform. Also, further implementation of regulatory reform should 
remain a priority for the Government, to ensure an eﬃ  cient relocation of redundant 
human resources from the public to the private sector.
Because the next IMF tranches will be based on the more severe SBA terms, the 
Government has to ensure the budgetary defi cit and other macroeconomic indicators 
within the limits agreed with IMF. Keeping the budget defi cit in 2010 below 5% 
without further optimization in public sectors (education and health) seems very 
problematic.
The agreed memorandum with IMF opens to Moldova many opportunities 
regarding the attraction of foreign assistance for many infrastructural projects. 
Even though the Government is short of money for current expenditures (for 
paying wages, utilities and others) it is important that money coming from external 
donors is invested in projects with maximum economic eﬀ ect in long-run and not 
consumed. We believe that capital repair of national roads can render the maximal 
benefi t for the economy in long-term.
?
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2.Gross Domest ic  Product
This chapter analyzes the GDP evolution over the fi rst two quarters of 2009, not only compared to 
the same periods of 2008, but also to the potential GDP forecasted using a SARIMA dynamic model. 
The sources of GDP decline both by expenditures and production sectors are identifi ed in detail. 
The chapter fi nalizes with a basic forecast regarding the evolution and structure of GDP in 2009 and 
2010. 
Visible versus real decline of the GDP
The decrease in domestic and foreign demand has had a tremendous eﬀ ect on the Moldovan 
GDP, which has declined in the fi rst semester of 2009 by 7.8%. Although the decline was lower 
than in many of the countries in the region (Chart 2), it has aﬀ ected all categories of economic 
agents through all possible channels. Moreover, the 7.8% decline in the fi rst semester does not 
refl ect the real losses that Moldovan economy has suﬀ ered and the overall impact of the global 
crisis. This is explained by the fact that, if no crisis had occurred, the GDP would have continued 
to grow strongly in 2009. I.e. the 7.8% GDP decline is only the visible not the entire eﬀ ect of the 
fi nancial crisis.
Chart 2 GDP decline in some countries of the region in Q1-Q2’2009, %, y-o-y
Note: *Q1-Q3’2009/Q1-Q3’2008;
Source: National bureaus of statistics;
In order to assess the real decline of the GDP we have forecasted the potential GDP in 2009 using 
a dynamic model (SARIMA) that decomposes dynamic series in three components: the trend, 
seasonality and random factor. Combining these three factors we can get the potential GDP 
that would have been registered in “ordinary” conditions. According to the model, the real GDP 
decline was much higher – 15.1% - both in the fi rst and second quarter, compared to the values 
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of 6.9% and 8.6% on yearly base (Chart 3). Therefore, even after the resumption the economic 
growth, which most probably will take place in 2011, the Moldovan GDP will be much lower than 
its potential.
Chart 3 GDP evolution and forecast for 2009 (thou. MDL)
Source: EG calculations based on NBS national accounts data;
Sources of GDP decline by expenditure and production sectors
After a 4-year long period of signifi cant growth in investment, a 59% decrease of gross capital 
formation contributed with 20.2% to the decline of Moldova’s GDP in the fi rst semester of 2009. 
In the second quarter impact was even bigger (Chart 4). This dramatic fall in investment is the 
consequence of the global crisis that had mostly infl uenced the decrease of FDI, but also the 
result of political instability that had scared both domestic and foreign investors. The fall in FDI 
infl ows was more than impressive: on annual basis they declined 6 times in the fi rst quarter and 
14 times in the second quarter. 
Final households’ consumption also had a major contribution to the economic decline due to 
its high share in GDP. An interesting fact is that households’ consumption started decreasing 
before the income started, and even before the fall in remittances which in Moldova are 
highly correlated with consumption. This evolution was determined by the public’s awareness 
of the crisis and by its increasing propensity for savings, as it is explained in more details in 
Chapter 8.
As for the evolution of the GDP by production sectors, almost all of them contributed to the 
economy’s decline (Chart 5). In the agriculture the gross value added (GVA) has increased, but 
with almost negligible eﬀ ect on the GDP growth and the positive growth turned to negative in 
the third quarter 2009. All other sectors had contributed negatively to the economic growth, with 
the most signifi cant impact coming from the industrial sector that suﬀ ered from reduced demand 
both domestic, but especially foreign. GVA in service sector decreased the least; however, with 
worsening trend over the second quarter. 
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Chart 4 GDP growth by expenditures in Q1 and Q2’2009 (%, y-o-y)
Source: EG calculations based on NBS national accounts data
Chart 5 GDP growth by production sectors in Q1 and Q2’2009, %, y-o-y
Source: EG calculations based on National Accounts data
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Outlook for 2009 and 2010
Based on the forecasts of expenditure and production components of the GDP (see 
chapters 3-9) for the end of 2009, we expect a GDP decline of 8-11% for the current 
year, which is in line with the IMF forecast of 9% decline1 and with our previous 
economic forecasts indicating a decline between 6% and 12%2. In 2010, due to the 
expected recovery of the main trade partners of the Republic of Moldova and also 
of the countries where most of Moldovan migrants work, we forecast a moderate 
economic growth of about 1%. 
Due to the higher impact of crisis on industrial and service sectors, the structure 
of GDP will slightly change, with an increase of agricultural sector share to about 
9-10%, despite the overall decline of the agricultural sector. However, it is not 
expected that this will be a long term evolution and already in 2010 its share will 
decline again, mainly due to the expected growth in service sector and low growth 
of the agricultural sector.
Capital investments have already decreased by 40% in nine months of the year and 
most probably this rate of decline will persist by the end of the year. It is diﬃ  cult 
to assess the evolutions for 2010 as they will depend not only on the economic 
recovery and a possible increase in FDI, but also on the political situation in the 
Republic of Moldova. However, a slight increase in investments, both domestic and 
foreign is expected in 2010. 
Challenges ahead
As fi nal consumption forms the main share of Moldovan GDP, even a slight variation 
in consumption will have a sizable impact on the economic growth. Due to the 
decrease of households’ income in 2009, which will continue to the end of the 
year, but also because of the general concerns of the population regarding future 
economic developments, the propensity to consume is decreasing, while propensity 
to save is strengthening. Therefore, without Governmental intervention, we do not 
expect a signifi cant increase in consumption in short term. One of the main roles 
of the Government should be the stimulation of consumption, which consequently 
will infl uence domestic production and imports. So far the Government has avoided 
the decrease in VAT for some goods and services (constructions, computers) as 
an instrument of consumption stimulation. However, we believe that this is an 
important measure that should be taken into consideration as it can increase 
consumption, without a negative impact on the budgetary revenues.
Another important source of GDP decline is the investments collapse. Although the 
economic recovery should theoretically contribute to the increase in investments in 
2010, the Government of Moldova should take more eﬀ orts to improve the image of the 
Republic of Moldova on the international arena and increase the investors’ confi dence 
in the new Government. So far, these investors have remained reluctant to investing in 
Moldova, taking into consideration the long-lasting political turmoil in 2009.
The recovery of main trade partners in 2010 (not expected to be very signifi cant) 
will not necessarily generate a proportional increase in exports as many Moldovan 
companies have cancelled the contracts with their partners. Thus, for many of 
them it would be a challenge to renew the relations with the old partners, but also 
to set contacts with new trade partners. The main role of the Government is to 
eliminate all barriers in the trade operations, as there are no other governmental 
tools (including fi nancial and fi scal) to help the companies recover.
1 World Economic Outlook, IMF, October 2009
2 MEGA, issues 1, May 2009.
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3 .  A g r i c u l t u r e
This chapter deals with the recent evolutions in the agricultural sector. It shows that the decline 
in the crops subsector registered in 2009 will not be a dramatic one and in fact it does not 
diverge from the long-term trend. Further on main evolutions in the livestock subsector are 
assessed, with an emphasis on the impact of the prices trends. New agricultural policy which 
is being formulated by the new Government is also subject of this chapter. It ends with the 
general outlook for 2010 of the agricultural sector and the main challenges that producers and 
government will have to face.
Analysis of crops subsector developments in 2009
The agricultural output in Q1-Q3’2009 has declined 10.2% y-o-y in real terms and the decline was 
totally due to falling crops production (-17%). Should the Moldovan government and agricultural 
producers treat this fi gure as a dramatic decline? No, and this is because the baseline year 2008 
was an abnormally positive one for the crops production, following the abnormally negative year 
2007 when a catastrophic drought stroke. As shown in the Chart 6, with an overall decline of 18-
19% the total value of the crops production in 2009 is expected to be slightly below the long-term 
trend line. However, the production value could have been much higher in real terms. Smaller 
quantity of harvested cereals is the main reason of falling agricultural production. On the other 
hand, improved yields of some high-value crops (vegetables, fruits, grapes) have prevented a 
deeper decline of the crops production value.
Chart 6 Evolution of agricultural production in 1990-2008, and forecast for 2009-2010, 1990=100%
Source: NBS, forecast for 2009 and 2010 by EG.
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While the general picture of the crops sector would not be much worrying, a deeper structural 
analysis shows some negative trends. Moldovan crops producers apparently have not yet learnt 
how agricultural market is functioning and are acting short-sighted by the prices in the previous 
period when they take decisions regarding the allocation of the land plots for diﬀ erent crops. As 
result, overinvestment for plantations of cereals and sunfl ower usually associates with low price 
levels in the harvesting period which hits severely the producers. And the 2009 was such a year 
with a dramatic fall in crops prices across the board, except a few crops such as tobacco and 
tomatoes. To make things even worse, in 2009 the cereals yields have been much lower than on 
average for 1995-2008: the wheat yields by 10%, for barley – by 5% and for corn – 15%, which further 
dented the farmers’ income. Because of falling prices and yields, the better quality of the wheat 
harvested in 2009 did not compensate the farmers their big quantitative losses.
Evolution of the livestock subsector
With swine and sheep stocks on rise in 2009, the livestock sector production increased by 8.6% 
y-o-y in Q1-Q3’2009 and we expect that the annual growth will reach 8.1% in 2009. The level of 
production in 2009 will be slightly higher than the trend suggests (Chart 6), but this is not an 
especially impressive performance.
The meat producers have been fortunate in 2009 by stable or even increasing prices. As result, 
production of meat will likely increase by 15% in 2009 to reach 125.2 thousand tone. In Q1-Q3’2009 
the farmers sold the bovine meat at prices exceeding 4.2% the level of Q1-Q3’2008; sheep and 
goat meat was 7.6% more expensive. However, with high production costs, the profi tability for 
both bovine meat and sheep/goat meat producers remained negative in 2009 and no positive 
changes are expected for 2010 in this regard. The pork price did not change signifi cantly, but we 
estimate that it has grown in the last quarter so that by the end of the year it will be 2.5% more 
expensive than in December 2008. The poultry price decreased by 10% in Q1-Q3’2009 and will 
not change much by the end of the year. Both pork and poultry production provide high level of 
profi tability and we expect that an increasing number of small farmers in Moldova will turn from 
cattle to pork meat production, while the number of poultry will increase mostly in the mid- to 
large farms, where economies of scale are easier to be achieved than in the households sector 
or small farms sector. Despite a recent decline in eggs price, the production volume increased 
in 2009 (+9.5%) and we expect that the production growing trend will persist in the future, 
mainly due to growing number of poultry and high levels of profi ts that this branch provides to 
producers.
The milk production is presently having a diﬃ  cult time. With dramatically falling prices (-29% 
expected for the entire year 2009), the farmers have limited if any incentives to increase their 
production in the short term and the total milk output for 2009 is expected barely to match 
the level of 2008 (about 540 thousand tone). However, it is interesting to note that average 
productivity of cows has been on constant rise (from 2.14 tone/cow in 2001 to 3.45 tone/cow in 
2009) while the number of cattle reduced drastically (153 thousand in Q1-Q3’2009 as opposed to 
269 thousand in 2001). This suggests that milk producers are becoming more eﬃ  cient; because of 
this we believe that that production of milk will remain stable in 2010. 
An interesting market twist has been the recent surge in the wool prices (10.7 thousand MDL/tone 
expected for end-2009 as compared with 4.3 thousand MDL/tone in 2008). Moldova is not an 
important wool producer (on average 2000 tone/year in 2000-2009), but with wool prices going 
up at such a rate as in 2009, many small farmers will probably consider increasing their sheep and 
goat stocks. The livestock has already increased by 2% in 2009 but raising it further rapidly may be 
a mistake taken into account that the profi tability of this activity is among the lowest in Moldovan 
agricultural sector (estimated at -70% in 2009). 
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New Government – new agricultural policy 
We expect that with the Moldovan Government changing in September 2009, signifi cant 
changes in the agricultural policy will happen too. The current Government departs from the 
“land consolidation” mantra that communist Government professed in the last 8 years and 
tries to concentrate on issues related to rational use of land resources, on elimination of critical 
constraints to agricultural development and on provision of critical governmental inputs and 
services. As regards the agricultural sector, the new governmental agenda includes 6 ambitious 
key goals:
Ensuring country food security and increasing competitiveness of the Moldovan 
agricultural products and exports;
Harmonizing the national system of standards and technical regulation with the 
EU system;
Increasing eﬃ  ciency of the agricultural subsidy program;
Integrating agricultural assets in the general economic circuit and increasing 
investors’ access to these assets;
Improving human resources for agriculture through agricultural extension 
institutions;
Stopping the degradation of the soil resources.
However, reaching or at least moving closer to these goals requires not only a clear agenda for 
reforms and strong political support, but also signifi cant institutional changes. This is why we 
believe that the new minister of agriculture (Mr. Valeriu Cosarciuc) will probably have fi rst to 
reshuﬄ  e and downsize the behemoth Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry and its subsidiary 
institutions before he starts implementing any ambitious reform. (Such downsize would be also 
in line with the governmental commitments to reduce the number of public employees by 4000 
units in 2010). In the last decade, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry has lost its former 
prestige and it was perceived more as a secondary player in formulating agricultural policy. 
There is no secret that the Ministry often acted as promoter of obscure industrial interests or as 
executor of the indications given from above (Presidency). Equally important, District Agricultural 
Directions have to be restructured. While most of their staﬀ  is well trained in agro-techniques 
they lack even the basic capacity for designing and promoting agricultural policy at regional level 
and are only serving as information collectors/dispatchers and organizers of Ministry staﬀ  visits 
“in the territory”. 
Right policy is important but farmers change of mind and better training is more important for a 
sustainable agricultural development. Presently, most of the key productivity indicators related 
to agriculture in Moldova are very low both in a historical perspective and in an international 
comparison. Even the strong growth of crops production in 2008 and of animal products in 2009 
was just a post-drought recovery and not a signifi cant breakthrough. After surging in 2008, in 
2009 the yields for the crops providing basic food security (wheat, corn, and barley) continued to 
decline and the expected growth in 2010 is minor (Chart 7). With such a high volatility of the yields, 
the Ministry of Agriculture may consider ensuring the population food security by liberalizing 
imports of these crops rather than by counting exclusively on domestic production capacities. In 
this context, it is clear that Moldova will not be able to outperform Ukraine and Romania which 
are better endowed with large areas of land to produce grains.
?
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Chart 7 Evolution of the cereals yields 1995-2008 and forecast 2009-2010, 100 kg/ha
Source: NBS, forecast by EG;
From another hand, productivity of other important agricultural products has increased, 
especially of the sugar beet, vegetables, potatoes, fruits and grapes (shown in the Chart 8). This 
supports the idea that Moldova should use its outstanding natural resources (climate and soil) for 
producing more high-value agricultural products and fewer cereals.
Chart 8 Evolution of high-value added crops yields 1995-2008 and forecast 2009-2010, 
100 kg/ha
Source: NBS, forecast by EG;
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Reversing the negative trends and encouraging the positive ones is a key challenge for the new 
policymakers. However they will have to take into account that even those crops that performed 
well in the last years return yields which a far from EU or CEE average. While having higher quality 
soils, Moldova has wheat yields 25% below the CEE level, almost 50% below for corn, 1/3 below for 
sugar beet and more than 50% for the potatoes (Table 1). 
Table 1 Productivity indicators for some agricultural products, 2008
wheat yield, 
100 kg/ ha
corn yield, 
100 kg/ ha
sugar beet yield, 
100 kg/ ha
potatoes 
yield, 100 kg/ 
ha
sunfl ower 
yield, 100 
kg/ ha
collected milk, 
tone/dairy cow/
year
European Union-15 59.5 95.7 640.5 336.0 18.0 6.6
CEE countries 43.3 60.0 508.4 183.0 19.7 4.0
Bulgaria 41.7 41.6 162.7 18.0 2.1
Romania 34.0 32.4 346.4 142.9 14.3 0.7
Moldova 33.9 34.4 372.2 86.5 16.3 3.3
Ukraine 30.9 - 356 139 15.3 4.1
Source: NBS, Eurostat, CISstat and EG calcualtions.
Outlook for 2010
The outlook of the Moldovan agricultural sector for 2010 is quite bleak, with only a 
1.7-2.5% growth of production in real terms. The trend of small farmers leaving the 
sector will continue, mainly because of the severe fi nancial constraints that they 
have presently.
We expect that as result of the falling prices in 2009 the areas sown with wheat 
for the 2010 harvest will decrease by 20%. At the same time, areas under corn will 
increase by about 9-10% because farmers will prefer to have their own (even though 
low quality) fodder for the increasing number of cattle. 
No signifi cant improvement in cereals productivity is expected because of the 
fi nancial constraints impeding farmers to buy high quality fertilizers and other 
necessary inputs. We expect that total crops production in 2010 will increase by 5-
6% in real terms and that will be again a recovery growth after the decline in 2009.
The livestock is expected to register a positive but rather feeble growth on 3-
4%. This growth will be driven by pork and poultry meat production and by eggs 
production. We do not believe that a signifi cant growth of the produced milk is 
possible, even though there has been a strong growth of dairy cows productivity 
lately.
Challenges ahead
Moldova has a bigger productivity potential in production of vegetables and fruits 
than most of the countries in the region, but this potential is not fully used. The 
productivity indicators both in crops and livestock subsectors are very low and 
some positive trends registered in the recent years are not yet very convincing. 
Making use of the unexploited potential remains main challenge for Moldovan 
agricultural producers and policymakers.
?
?
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Implementing the new agricultural policy that the current Government has 
adopted will be diﬃ  cult. For instance, provision of the food security requires two 
key preconditions: 1) stabilization of prices and 2) constant increase in productivity 
indicators of the agricultural producers. We believe that these two goals should be 
on the top of priorities list of the new agricultural policy in Moldova.
For prices stabilization, the government will have to use some tools of market 
intervention (intervention reserves, forecasted prices), but their expected 
impact is quite small because of the limited resources the government has. With 
external prices for agricultural products constantly bigger than domestic ones, the 
government has also to ensure free access of the Moldovan producers to foreign 
markets. But for farmers to count exclusively on governmental support would be 
totally unwise. Producers themselves have a big role to play in setting market prices 
by coordinating horizontally their investment plans. Producers associations, unions 
and product councils have a key role in this.
Reaching sustainable productivity increases will probably take longer time than 
stabilizing prices. Productivity is linked to fundamental factors, such as competent 
and trained human resources, good seeds and genes, rational use of fertilizers 
and developed agricultural infrastructure (irrigation, agro-technical consultancy, 
competent veterinary service providers and so on). Providing these inputs/
facilitating their provision/eliminating constraints that impede private providers, 
this is the range of issues that practical agricultural policy should target in 2010 and 
beyond.
?
?
?
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4. Industry and infrastructure
This chapter tries to assess the impact of the fi nancial crisis on Moldovan industrial sector in 2009 
and shows that almost all of its subsectors have been severely hit. The chapter makes a geographical 
comparison of the industrial growth in CIS and CEE region and shows that Moldova is likely to 
experience one of the deepest declines in this region. We are looking at the new industrial policy 
formulated in the new governmental agenda and stress that improving corporate management 
should be among the top priorities. This part of the MEGA #2 ends with a brief outlook of the 
industrial sector for 2010 and with a summary of main challenges that the sector will confront 
with.
Industry and fi nancial crisis
Following a series of external shocks, the Moldovan industrial sector stagnated in January-
September 2008 and contracted 5% in the last quarter of 2008. As result, the Moldova’s industry 
entered the year 2009 already in very bad shape. The global fi nancial crisis and falling external 
demand resulted in an even more severe 25% recession of the industrial output in January-
April 2009. In the second and third quarters 2009 the industrial output stabilized at 75% of the 
production level for 2008, with some positive yet rather feeble trends emerging in October-
November (Chart 9). 
Chart 9 Evolution of the Moldovan industry in 2008-2009, y-o-y,%
Source: NBS and EG estimates
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We expect that for the whole year 2009 the recession will be -20% in best case and this will be 
probably one of the worst performances both among the European and CIS countries (see Chart 
10 and Chart 11). One of the conclusions that can be derived from such a dramatic evolution is 
that Moldovan companies are very ineﬃ  cient in adapting to new market requirements and to 
serve their customers under more diﬃ  cult conditions. With poor anti-crisis management skills 
and with doubtful willingness to learn them, many Moldovan producers are only inclined to ask 
the Government for introducing “protection” measures (higher customs tariﬀ s, lower tax rates, 
continuation of the zero-rate tax on the reinvested income etc.) and are not looking at how they 
can overcome the companies’ internal weaknesses.
We have not heard of any Moldova company adopting active programs to deal with the new 
conditions set up by the fi nancial crisis. Indeed, in 2009 there has been no spectacular restructure 
of any middle or large company; and very few strategic mergers/acquisitions. Such measures 
would be obvious for an economy caught by a severe crisis. Instead, the Moldovan companies are 
passively waiting for better times, with rising stocks of unsold goods, unfi nished constructions, 
fi red labour and so on.
Chart 10 Growth of industrial output in CIS countries in Q1-Q3’2009, y-o-y, %
Source: CIS Stat;
The evolution of the textiles, apparel and shoes production sectors is the most telling example 
of the negative impact of lack of strategic management skills. Most of the companies in these 
sectors got used in the last decade to work under lohn arrangements for external customers 
(mainly from Italy, Germany and Romania) and few of them bothered to develop own brands. As 
result, these important sectors of the Moldovan industry (with a share of 15% of total industrial 
production in 2008) are presently suﬀ ering one of the deepest recessions. This is not to say that 
managers of these companies are technically incompetent. They have a lot of technical expertise, 
but these skills are necessary for engineers overseeing the technological process, while managers 
would be expected to be fi rst of all leaders with more strategic visions.
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Chart 11 Growth of industrial output in European countries in August 2009, y-o-y, %
Source: Eurostat, NBS
It is interesting to note that not all industrial sub-sectors are currently declining, as probably 
most of the policymakers and public believe. For instance, in Q1-Q3’2009 the production of 
tobacco products has grown by 2.6%, production of animals’ fodder – by 70% and of sugar – by 
10%. However, except tobacco industries, the other two performances have little to do with 
management improvement. The growth of the tobacco products comes after a long period of 
economic decline, and partly has been determined by a recent change in management staﬀ . The 
growth of the animals’ fodder consumption comes as result of a good harvest of fodder crops 
and increased demand from the part of the livestock growers. As for the sugar, its production has 
been lately supported by high customs tariﬀ s protecting domestic sugar market, an eﬀ ect which 
is likely to vanish in 2010-2011.
There are some more positive signs in the mining industry, where the collapse from the late 2008-
early 2009 (about -70%-80%) is over, with a “milder” -20% y-o-y decline registered in September 
2009. As the constructions sector does not show any sign of recovery we expect the growth of 
the mining industry to remain negative in the fourth quarter 2009.
Winemaking sector is presently the main sector hanging on the growth of domestic industry. Its 
situation was particularly diﬃ  cult in Q1’2009, when the production fell by 27%, and it marginally 
improved in the next two quarters (with a -20% growth rate in Q3’2009). A big number of 
companies in the sector face existential challenges and many have already bankrupted, are fi ring 
their staﬀ  and closing down production. A number of large companies are not yet in bankruptcy 
but are very close to it, including many state-owned companies. Some businessmen from the 
sector call this situation as “catastrophe”. At the same time, those producers who were able to 
timely restructure the production and started targeting new markets (including the domestic 
one) or are selling wine stocks for brandy production will probably get through these diﬃ  cult 
times easier than others. 
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In the vegetables and fruits canning industry, the steep production decline is related to the 
accumulation of large production stocks (about USD 25 million in September 2009). Again, we see 
this situation as a problem resulting from improper marketing strategies. Most of the companies 
in the sector continue operating under traditional management schemes and are very slow in 
improving their quality standards. In 2009 the meat processing and meat products sub-sector has 
declined in real terms by more than 20%, and this is despite stable domestic demand and growing 
domestic production of the raw material. This is just another example of defi cient management 
skills. On the other hand, a number of companies that have adopted quality management schemes 
are exporting successfully their products to EU and have not been so dramatically aﬀ ected by the 
crisis. 
Towards a new philosophy of industrial policy
A number of new policy issues related to industry have emerged after instalment of a new 
Government in September 2009. The governmental program promotes a new vision of the 
industrial policy. According to this program, the industrial policy should aim at promotion 
of technological development of the companies, provision of technically competent human 
resources, development of a business-support infrastructure and of a knowledge-based economy. 
We believe that this competitiveness approach is right. Because decisions aﬀ ecting companies’ 
competitiveness are taken at governmental and corporate levels, the government should target 
two strategic directions: provision of eﬀ ective governmental services enhancing competitiveness 
and promoting corporate management eﬃ  ciency.
The government has started on its part of the fi eld with elimination of some key constraints 
aﬀ ecting the domestic industrial producers. The eﬀ ect of such actions can be immediate, as 
shown by the example of the winemaking sector. Winemaking and vinery industry is suﬀ ering 
because of two interrelated problems: lack of short-term fi nancial resources and lack of access to 
external markets. After Russia introduced its trade embargo in 2006, the Moldovan government 
has only worsened the situation by introducing its own “embargo” against Moldovan winemakers 
through unwarranted barriers to trade (state marks, certifi cations, interdiction of exporting raw 
wine, cross-controls and others). Oﬃ  cially, these barriers to trade were set to ensure high quality 
of exported Moldovan wines. As a matter of fact, they only created market distortions, enabled 
installing political control on the sector and set conditions for hostile taking over. The September 
2009 abolishment of barriers to exports of raw wine and grapes has been a signifi cant boost for 
unlocking the industry. According to recent information, in October 2009 the exports increased 
three-fold, however big losses and companies’ closures are yet unavoidable. 
Abolishment of unwarranted interdictions will probably continue provided that the Government 
remains stable. However, the Government should also impose better corporate governance 
standards in order to increase the companies’ competitiveness. Few governmental oﬃ  cials and 
economic journalists in Moldova have noticed that in the Doing Business 2010 report Moldova 
is very bad positioned in terms of investors’ protection rights and it fell in the new rating (from 
position 104 in 2009 to position 109 in 2010). Basically, this means that executive directors of 
companies are not held responsible by the shareholders (be them private or public) and the rights 
of the shareholders are not properly enforced and defended. This relates both to private and public 
companies, and the most telling example of decisions aﬀ ecting interests of minority shareholders 
is how Moldtelecom and Banca de Economii management adopted decisions of providing funds 
for reconstruction of the Parliament and Presidency buildings destroyed as result of April 7 riots.
However, the companies themselves have much to do in order to become more competitive. 
Learning new management skills is a precondition for this and the government can little do in 
this respect if the managers do not want to learn. Obviously, the government can swiftly change 
management incentives in the state-owned companies and thus to increase eﬃ  ciency of these 
companies. 
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Outlook for 2010
We believe that in 2010 the Moldovan industry will stop declining and a positive 
growth of 5-6% of the production volume will be registered. Obviously, this growth 
rate will not be enough to recover to the pre-crisis levels.
Main drivers of the industry growth will be the winemaking sector (with an expected 
production growth rate of 12%) and production of non-metaliferous products, 
mainly construction materials (+15%). Such sectors as textiles, clothes and shoes 
production will stagnate or even fall further, because most of the companies lost 
their lohn-processing contracts and it will take longer time to fi nd new customers 
or to put in place own products.
We think also that mining and quarrying industry will register positive growth of 
about 10%, but its impact on the total industrial output will be negligible. Also, 
this growth will be mainly determined by the demand coming from the informal 
constructions sector rather than formal one.
Energy sector will register a positive growth as well, driven by the growing demand 
from the part of the households and industry, but the growth is most likely to 
remain below 3%.
Challenges ahead
The new government already confronts with a signifi cant challenge which can 
worsen further. After it came to power the new Government “discovered” that most 
of the market regulatory agencies are not functional. As result of this, many economic 
sectors are functioning ineﬃ  ciently, while unrealistically high or unrealistically low 
levels of prices lead to unfair distribution of the income in the society. Government 
has started some activities to rid some markets of trust agreements (meat, fi sh) 
with some other markets subject to similar actions in the future.
However, a sustainable progress is diﬃ  cult to be achieved by the Ministry of 
Economy manually piloting the economy, and this is because market inquires and 
anti-trust supervisions will have to remain permanent in the foreseeable future. 
Such activities have to be performed not by the Ministry of Economy (which is a 
policy development center and not a regulatory body), but rather by the National 
Agency for Competition Protection which has such a legal mandate. The Agency has 
to be eﬀ ectively empowered (with human resources and a clear regulatory backup) in 
order to undertake eﬀ ective market inquiries and enforce anti-trust rules. Obviously, 
this means that the Agency should remain independent from the government, even 
though a stronger political control from the Parliament is necessary.
Management malpractices in the state-owned enterprises form a separate chapter 
in the Moldovan management tradition. Most of these companies are poorly run 
and are only a drain on budget resources. With a new government ruling the country 
and the economy, time has come to investigate objectively the performance of the 
corporate and fi nancial management of the state-owned companies in times of crisis 
and to make necessary decisions regarding restructuring or privatization. 
?
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In this part of the analysis we are looking briefl y at a phenomenon which has not been seen since 
early transition – the collapse of the investment and constructions activity. We try to estimate where 
the investment activity and constructions sector will head in 2010 and to shed some light on two 
most critical constraints.
Overview of investments and constructions in 2009
Capital investment collapsed in 2009, and we expect that by the end of the year the volume of 
investment will barely exceed 55% of the 2008 level. The investment in technological equipment 
and machines is expected to contract by 50%, in production buildings and oﬃ  ces – by 55%, and in 
transport units – by 69%. High interest rates for long-term banking loans, shallow capital markets 
and lack of own fi nancial resources combined with general economic pessimism of the companies 
and represent the ultimate causes of such a dramatic decline in investment activity.
Important to say, such rates of decline of the investment activity as in 2009 Moldova has seen 
only in its early transition period: in 1992-1994 the investment rate fell on average by 53% per year 
and has set the stage for a long and diﬃ  cult economic recommencement. However, we do not 
expect that this time economic resumption will take so lo long, because companies have invested 
signifi cantly in their productive capacities in the last 3-4 years and presently most of them operate 
at only half or even less of their capacities. However, it is clear that such kind of growth will be 
only a recovery growth and will not represent any qualitative shifts.
In this context, it is particularly worrying that foreign direct investment in Moldovan economy 
fell at fastest rate in 2009; according to the balance of payments, in the fi rst half of 2009 the 
FDI infl ow contracted almost 9-fold (from USD 309.4 million in H1’2008 to USD 34.6 million 
in H1’2009). We believe that by the end of 2009 the FDI infl ows will further contract and the 
end fi gure will not get above USD 60 million (as compared with USD 707 million in 2008). If 
the new Government fails to convey more trust and optimism regarding country’s economic 
perspectives, Moldova will be deemed to undergo a more diﬃ  cult and longer exit from its 
present crisis.
In 2000s the construction-assembly works has been the most essential type of investments 
in Moldova, going from 46% of total capital investment in 2001 to 56% in 2008. Residential 
constructions represented in 2008 about 1/3 of the total construction-assembly works. As 
mentioned in the MEGA #1, the fi rst-round eﬀ ects of the world fi nancial crisis on the Moldovan 
construction sector became visible back in mid-2008, with the volume of construction works 
declining by 1.6% in 2008. The recession of the constructions sector worsened even more in 2009, 
with some more encouraging trends emerging in Q2’2009 but reversing again in Q3’2009. We 
expect that situation will worsen a bit more by the end of the year and that the overall fi gure for 
the year will be -40% (Chart 12).
Residential segment suﬀ ered particularly much, as result in Q1-Q3’2009 it shrunk to less than ¼ 
of the total constructions sector. As expected in MEGA #1, the demand-side shock continued 
throughout 2009 and forced a gradual reduction of the prices for housing (about 15% as compared 
with end 2008). However, this decline was not enough to entice buyers to buy actively on the 
residential housing market.
5. Investments and constructions 
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Chart 12 Evolution of construction works, y-o-y % of the previous period
Source: NBS and estimates by EG;
Outlook for 2010
We expect that in 2010 the investment activity will resume but the growth will 
be modestly positive, with a 5-7% growth rate of the capital investment. This can 
improve signifi cantly if the country remains politically stable and becomes more 
attractive as location of foreign direct investment.
Prices for residential and productive real estate will probably stabilize in 2010 and 
will thus provide more certainty to both sellers and buyers.
Constructions sector as a whole will start growing again, but we expect a modest 
recovery rate of 3-5%. We believe that in 2010 a consolidation of the sector will 
start, with the number of operating companies set to decrease drastically.
Challenges ahead
Restarting investment activity in general and constructions sector in particular 
is of key importance for a sustainable economic recovery of the country. These 
objectives are part of the governmental program and of the economic recovery 
plan. The program provides for many reforms that are supposed to make life easier 
for the investors (such as streamlining of construction authorizing procedures and 
easier rezoning). However, there are some thorny issues that remain. The most 
important one is the danger that constructions sector poses for the banking sector.
In 2008 commercial banks provided about 15% of their total loans to construction and 
development companies. Because of the market fall these money are now partially 
lost. Banks are not interested to take over the collateral because of the liquidity 
problems. From another hand construction companies do not want to further reduce 
the prices and are expecting the market price to bend up again soon in the future. 
However, we do not believe that prices will start growing soon. The government has 
included in the economic recovery program two important measures concerning 
the constructions sector: 1) developing mortgage system and 2) providing credits 
to construction companies to fi nish residential projects. Neither of the proposed 
solution is able to unlock the constructions market which overheated during the last 
years. Indeed, the constructions will likely use the money to reimburse their banking 
loans and not to fi nish the construction projects. The losses have to be internalized 
by speculative investors, banks and construction companies, and not by end investors 
(families and individuals buying apartments and houses for living).
?
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This section deals with the most important sector of the Moldovan economy – services. It analyses 
how the sector performed under the crisis conditions, based on tourism, transport and retail 
trade and service sub-sectors. Further on we assert the idea that institutional measures – such as 
streamlining regulatory environment, empowering market regulatory agencies - are those that can 
help the sector develop sustainably in the future. The chapter ends by enlisting main sector’s trends 
for 2010 and identifying some thorny issues challenging services growth.
Main evolutions in the sector
Services sector has proven to be the most resilient under the current economic recession. Even 
though the current year began with a signifi cant contraction of many services sub-sectors, in 
the second part of the year the situation improved. According to our estimates, the production 
volume and gross valued added generated by services sector will decline only 2-3% in 2009.
However, in the cargo transportation sector, one of the most important service sectors, situation 
is much worse. As seen from the Chart 13 the transport of passengers segment suﬀ ered very 
little as compared with the transport of goods segment, where the volume of transported cargo 
collapsed more than 3 times. Reduced demand on the CIS markets has hit particularly hard the 
railroad transportation of goods. The road transportation of goods suﬀ ered most of all because 
of the falling domestic demand.
Chart 13 Evolution and forecast of the transported goods and persons, 2006-2009
Source: NBS, forecast by EG
6 .  S e r v i c e s
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Tourism sector has also suﬀ ered to some extent because of the fi nancial crisis, but the situation 
is a bit more nuanced. Financial crisis refl ected fi rst of all in declining demand for hotel services 
in Chisinau, which were not able to adapt their price-schedules to new fi nancial constraints. At 
the same time, the number of incoming tourists has grown in annual terms (+28%) even though 
this is not enough to make a credible reversal of the negative trend that started in 2007 (Chart 
14). Another interesting remark is that during these diﬃ  cult fi nancial times the number of internal 
tourists (Moldovans going to Moldovan destinations) has continued its decreasing trend (about 
25%) while that of outgoing tourists has increased (+28%)! When fi nancial crisis stroke in late 2008 
we expected that many Moldovans in 2009 would prefer domestic tourist destinations to the 
external ones. But these fi gures clearly show that Moldova is not attractive as tourist destination 
even for its own citizens not to speak about the foreigners. Plans of the Government and of 
some of the sector operators about developing tourist routes to Moldova should be reviewed 
and correlated with the economic reality. The only way to go to make use of the (rather low) 
domestic tourist potential is to get Moldova integrated in international tourism routes involving 
Romania and/or Ukraine. Such routes have not been developed yet, and this is the task of the 
tourist operators and not of the government. Many “rural tourism” projects implemented in the 
years 2000s with donors’ support proved to be completely unsustainable so far.
Chart 14 Evolution and forecast of the tourism fl ows in Moldova, 2006-2009, thousand persons
Source: NBS, forecast by EG
Another interesting evolution is that of services rendered to population. The year 2009 started 
with a declining trend but this rapidly corrected in the second quarter and in fact the total growth 
for 2009 is expected to be positive, about 4-5% (Chart 15). Retail trade displayed a diﬀ erent, 
negative pattern, and despite some positive trends in the second part of the year, we expect that 
total volume of retail trade in 2009 will be 5% less than in 2008. However, one important remark 
should be added with respect to services to population and retail trade: their real growth is 
apparently higher than oﬃ  cially reported. A number of cases have been reported to us that many 
services companies and traders are trying to hide a part of their turnover for “fi scal optimization” 
reasons.
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Chart 15 Evolution of the retail trade and services rendered to population, y-o-y, %
Source: NBS, forecast by EG
Main policy issues
Governmental program for economic recovery provides for the implementation of a number of 
measures that will directly or indirectly reduce the costs of doing business in services sectors, as 
well as in other sectors.
A signifi cant provision of this program is integration of all state bodies participating to business 
registration procedures in an integral informational system to reduce the costs and time for 
business registration. Equally important, the program provides for the reduction of the number of 
economic activities subject to licensing. Reduction and streamlining of the procedures for getting 
sanitary permit and sanitary-veterinary permit is likely to positively surprise many companies 
in the food retail and catering sectors. However, a signifi cant issue will probably emerge here: 
many companies in Moldova are known to care little about the customers’ safety and health and 
the customers’ choice is not quite diverse. The government will have to consider how to better 
protect consumers’ rights and not only to make easier the companies’ life.
The prices for urban housing services and other public services dominated the policy discussions 
in 2009. The issue of the tariﬀ  for centrally supplied heating in the Chisinau municipality was a 
heavily politicized one, which has not yet reached a sound solution. The Government decided to 
intervene and to empower the National Agency for Energy Regulation (NAER) to set the tariﬀ s 
level. This is a move in the right direction, and this is the practice in many European countries too. 
However, this is not enough for setting up tariﬀ s which would be less contested by the public 
and politicians. The core problem is that NAER, as Chisinau municipal authorities, does not have 
a clear understanding on the fi nancial situation of the energy companies and its economic costs. 
The companies in the energy sector (Termocom, power-generation plants, Moldova-Gaz) have to 
be exposed to an independent fi nancial and performance audit in order for the policymakers and 
the public to be confi dent regarding any tariﬀ s policy decision.
The transport services have suﬀ ered a particularly severe recession in 2009 and the Government 
has declared that it will try to alleviate the situation. The problem is that the Government can 
little do for this sector immediately, except streamlining licensing and authorization procedures 
(including for international carriers). These measures have been included already in economic 
recovery program. However, in the long run the transporters will be right to demand higher 
quality roads and a more transparent collection road taxes and use of the Road Fund. 
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Outlook for 2010
We believe that in 2010 the service sector will see a rebound of up to 3%. This growth 
will be led by retail trade sector (+6%) and by the services rendered to population 
sector (+8%).
Transport sector will continue stagnating at the level of 2009, while other services 
provided mainly to businesses (such as IT) will probably register a moderate 
growth.
Tourism sector will remain largely where it was in 2009, without any signifi cant 
breakthrough in developing national routes and attracting more tourists to 
Moldova.
Challenges ahead
New Government has introduced some quite ambitious measures in its governing 
program and in the recent economic recovery plan. Among the most ambitious 
are those related to the restructure of the public services and infrastructure. For 
instance, it is planned to increase the access of alternative operators (private, 
foreign, mixed) to railroad, air transportation, communications, and to further 
liberalize these sectors. However, some of these sectors have grown in recent 
years in hard-to-blow political-economic conglomerates that spread their infl uence 
across many economic sectors and public administration layers. We believe that in 
some cases reaching the established goals will require a complete reshuﬄ  e of the 
current management and of the regulatory environment. A fi erce bureaucratic and 
institutional opposition is to be expected against implementation of these plans.
Consumers’ rights in Moldova are not adequately enforced and this subject is not 
present in the current policy debate. Moldova needs a strong National Agency for 
Protection of Consumers, which should be just as important as the National Agency 
for Competition Promotion. Consumers’ rights are a constant issue of policy and 
public debates in all European countries and we expect that it will become an 
important issue in Moldova – EU negotiations of the future agreement. Therefore, 
it is really important for the Government to consider creation of powerful National 
Agency for Protection of Consumers.
?
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This part of the analysis deals with main eﬀ ects of the global fi nancial crisis that manifested on the 
domestic labour market. It analyzes two key aspects of this market - employment and unemployment 
– by decomposing evolution in 2009 in trend-component and crisis-component. This chapter suggests 
that declining employment rate rather than unemployment rate should be the main concern for the 
government in 2010 and, probably, beyond.
Main evolutions in the context of the global fi nancial crisis
The global fi nancial crisis has exerted a signifi cant impact on domestic labour market in Moldova. 
Diminishing demand resulted in a reduced supply of goods and services and therefore in worsening 
of the labourers’ situation. The global fi nancial crisis has also taken many Moldovan migrants 
back to Moldova where jobs are missing as well; this infl ow of human resource only worsens even 
more the diﬃ  cult situation on the domestic labour market. 
The global fi nancial crisis impacted the labour market in many ways. It is apparently surprising 
that in conditions of the crisis the average wage per economy keeps on growing as reported 
by the NBS. Even though the nominal wages are not rising as fast as in 2008, because of the 
defl ation, the real wage in Moldova has grown in Q1-Q3’09 by 9.7%. Such an evolution is diﬃ  cult 
to explain if one does not take into account the methodology of NBS. In fact, this growth is only 
the result of the arithmetic and not an economic trend. NBS calculates the average wage by 
dividing the overall wage bill reported by companies to the number of employees who worked 
during the reference period. Because the number of employees decreases faster than the wage 
bill reported by companies, their ratio grows modestly or even remains stable. This is exactly 
what happened in 2009. An additional fact is that companies with number of employees below 
20 do not report their wages to NBS and it is very likely that in these smaller companies the 
wages registered a higher rate of decline. 
Therefore, the eﬀ ective wages have reduced in a number of sectors, even though in some of 
them not only as result of global fi nancial crisis. For instance, in the winemaking and other 
related sectors wages are declining because of the long-lasting eﬀ ects crisis enacted by the 
Russian trade embargo back in 2006. Others, such as mining industry and construction sector 
are victims of the crisis, with the real wages expected to decline more than 10% in 2009.
Jobs shedding, either because of the “technical unemployment” or because of the eﬀ ective 
closure of the job is another eﬀ ect of the global crisis. The magnitude of this eﬀ ect is conveyed 
by the fact that in Q1-Q2’09 the number of employed has drastically decreased, by 145 thousand 
people. While the general trend of employed population was negative in Moldova in the last 
ten years, it improved somewhat in 2007-2008. In 2009 the negative trend reversed again 
(Chart 16) and we estimate that about 80 thousand of the people lost their jobs because of the 
crisis. Employment rate in the fi rst half of the year has reached record low levels of 39%, the 
lowest not only in the group of transition countries but also the lowest in Moldova’s recent 
history.
7 .  L a b o u r  m a r k e t
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Chart 16 Evolution of the employed population in Q1’02-09 and Q2’02-09, thousand people
Source: NBS and EG
Rising unemployment and under-employment due to lay-oﬀ s, shorter working schedules and 
returning of migrants home is another very signifi cant impact of the crisis. The positive trend of 
declining unemployment that persisted in the last 7 years has defi nitely reversed in 2009 (Chart 
17). According to our estimates, about 80 thousand people in 2009 will be unemployed and 
between 35 and 40 thousand because of the crisis.
Chart 17 Evolution and forecast of unemployment rate, %
Source: NBS, forecast by EG;
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It has to be added that fi nancial crisis has resulted also in an increasing number of discouraged 
people. This means that the number of those avoiding searching for jobs because they believe 
that employment opportunities are scarce in times of crisis is on rise. Under normal conditions, 
about 8-9 thousand people in 2009 would be discouraged, but because of the crisis their number 
is likely to exceed 25 thousand. 
Because of the crisis, we have expected a big number of returning labour migrants to Moldova. 
Indeed, in the fi rst quarter of 2009 we have estimated a rather big number of 50 thousand 
migrants coming back to Moldova because of losing their jobs in the host country. However, we 
have not seen such an impact in the second quarter. This most probably means that migrants 
came back and after discovering that there are no jobs available in Moldova either, they decided 
to go back even to lower paid jobs than then had in the past. Political violence in April – May 2009 
probably has added to citizens’ pessimism regarding opportunities in Moldova.
Outlook for 2010
Employment rate is likely to continue declining in 2010 because many enterprises 
have adopted restructuring plans for 2010. Employment will also decline because 
of many public employees will be fi red or are expected to leave the public sector. 
On the other hand, that in 2010 the unemployment rate will remain as high as in 2009 
(around 6-7%), at least in the fi rst part of the year. Despite declining employment, 
unemployment rate will not rise because people will prefer to migrate or stay 
inactive rather than accept low wages.
Challenges ahead
With a relatively low unemployment rate, the Government will have pay attention 
to active labour policy targeting creation of the well–paid jobs. Main challenge 
for the government in 2010 remains thus creating proper conditions for private 
entrepreneurship because this is the ultimate panacea for the labour market 
problems.
?
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8 .  H o u s e h o l d s ’  i n c o m e
This chapter refl ects the evolution of households’ income in 2009, with a number of controversial 
developments, such as the decrease in remittances and wages in real sector and increase of social 
payments and wages in budgetary sector. It also identifi es the problems related to the diﬀ erence 
in data from diﬀ erent sources that create diﬃ  culties in formulating clear conclusions about the 
evolution of remittances. This is one of the challenges presented in a separate section at the end of 
the chapter. 
Changing structure of households income
Domestic and international economic developments in 2009 have infl uenced the income of 
the Moldova population that followed a decreasing trend over the whole year. According to 
the Household Budget Survey (HBS) data the decline of households’ income in the second 
quarter (2%) was even deeper as compared to the fi rst quarter (0.2%), which is also in line with 
the GDP developments in these periods. The decline in remittances in the second quarter 
(Chart 18) was the main factor contributing to the overall decline in the households’ income 
as it was expected at the incipient stage of the global crisis. This has been also refl ected in 
the structure of income, with remittances falling from the second position, where they have 
been placed since 2nd quarter of 2006 (Chart 19) to the third position being replaced by social 
payments. 
Chart 18 Evolution of different sources of households’ income in Q1’ and Q2’09, %
Source: EG calculations based on Household Budget Survey data;
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Chart 19 Structure of households’ income (%)
Source: Household Budget Survey;
The paradox of remittances
The evolution of remittances over 2009 is not very clear due to the signifi cant discrepancies in data 
sources. Firstly, there were always important diﬀ erences between remittances reported in the 
Balance of Payments and those calculated based on HBS data. On average, remittances reported 
in the Balance of Payments were twice higher than remittances according to HBS, suggesting that 
some of the remittances reported in the Balance of Payments are actually payments for goods 
and services delivered from Moldova or even some investments transfer, but paid as remittances 
due to lower administrative and transactional costs. In the fi rst quarter of 2009, these two sources 
have shown almost identical values for the fi rst time (Chart 20).
Chart 20 Value of remittances according to BoP and HBS (million USD)
Source: Balance of Payments and EG calculations based on HBS data
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At the same time, despite the decrease in remittances in the fi rst quarter according to the Balance 
of Payments data source, the data from the HBS showed a slight increase in the remittances 
year-on-year. These contradictory data suggest that, in the fi rst quarter, the remittances infl ows 
decreased because of those types of payments mentioned above (which actually do not represent 
remittances). However, in the second quarter the remittances have decreased according to both 
sources, indicating that the negative impact of crisis on migrants revenues aggravated. According 
to the data on the money transfers from abroad, they continued to decrease even more in July 
and August (Chart 21), therefore we may suspect that they further decreased in the 3rd quarter 
of 2009.
Chart 21 Evolution of money transfers from abroad (%)
Source: NBM;
Wages and social payments – the most important sources of income
In 2009 there were registered some controversial evolutions of other sources of income of the 
population. The value of social payments paid to the population has increased during the crisis 
period. There is no doubt that the share of economically vulnerable population is going up during 
crisis and the need in social payments is also more pressing. However, this evolution is mainly 
related to the April increase in pensions. Although pensions are still low in Moldova and do not 
cover the minimum living cost, the decision to increase them right before the Parliamentary 
elections gives a political fl avour to this act, taking into consideration the increasing budgetary 
defi cit and no certainty (at that moment) of any external credit or grant for covering the defi cit.
This also refers to the salaries in the budgetary sector. Thus, despite the increase in the average 
monthly salary in economy by 9.9% in three quarters of the year, the increase was not proportional 
by private and public sectors. It has mainly increased in the budgetary sector, and remained stable 
or even decreased in some economic sectors aﬀ ected by crisis (Chart 22). But statistical data on 
wages reported by the NBS, which identify an increase in average monthly salary, does not refl ect 
the real situation in the economy because it does not take into consideration the delays in the 
wage payments and/or the forced unpaid leaves that were common during the year. And there are 
some indicators showing that this has happened indeed. Firstly, according to the HBS, the income 
from salaries has increased less than 9% (0.3% in the 1st quarter and 3.7% in the 2nd quarter). 
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Chart 22 Growth rate of the real wage in some sectors in Q1-Q3’09, y-o-y, %
Source: NBS;
Another source of evidence is refl ected in the incomes collected from the taxation of the salaries 
(personal income tax, social security contribution and health insurance contribution), which 
are much lower than the planned incomes and the gap is constantly increasing. Together these 
sources show a real and signifi cant decline in households’ income that had worsened in the 
second quarter, and thus indicating a lasting impact of crisis on Moldova (Chart 23). 
Chart 23 Collected revenues as % of planned revenues from the taxation of salaries 
Source: Ministry of Finance
Outlook for 2009 and 2010
Remittances represent an important source of income for the households; therefore, 
their further evolution will infl uence the general trend of households’ income. As 
they are highly dependent on the economic situation in the countries where most of 
the Moldovan migrants work, the economic recovery in these countries is the key for 
?
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the reversal of the negative trend of remittances to Moldova. Based on the current 
IMF forecasts on the economic growth for 2009 and 2010 in the countries where 
most remittances come from (Russia, Ukraine, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
we expect a decrease between 35% and 40% in remittances volume by the end of 
2009. As for 2010 an economic growth is expected for both CIS countries (including 
Russia and Ukraine where Moldovan migrants work) and for EU (including Italy 
and Portugal hosting big numbers of working Moldovans), the remittances are also 
expected to increase based on previous trends, approximately by 5%. Thus, despite 
the expected end of decline in most of the countries where Moldovan citizen will 
work in 2010, Moldovan recovery will be painful and not immediate. 
As regards the other sources of income, in 2010 social payments and wages in 
budgetary sector will remain stable due to lack of fi nancial resources for further 
increases, except wages for the teaching staﬀ , which has been accepted by the MF. 
The wages in the real sector of the economy are expected to increase slightly in 
industrial, agricultural and service sectors (excluding construction sector) where 
there is a positive correlation between the evolution of labour productivity and 
evolution of wages.
Challenges ahead
Large gaps between data on remittances from diﬀ erent data sources points to 
the necessity to revise the methodology of refl ecting remittances in the Balance of 
Payments as they presently also include investments and other payments which 
are not remittances per se. It creates diﬃ  culties in data analysis and generates 
enormously high number for the share of remittances in GDP. This was refl ected in 
many IMF reports, but a solution has not been found yet. 
Moldovan social protection system does not refl ect the real needs of the population 
and, therefore, has to be reformed in the nearest future. On the one hand, the 
abolishment of nominal compensations and full transit to means-tested social 
allowance is discussed for a long time, but has not been fully implemented due to 
the political reasons. Currently, the Program for Economic Stabilisation and Revival 
of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-20111 stipulates a gradual abolishment of 
nominal compensation system by not increasing further the value of compensation 
and not allowing for registration of new benefi ciaries. We believe that the 
Government should fully abandon the nominal compensation as soon as possible. 
These resources can be better used for other urgent needs during crisis as, for 
example, the payment of unemployment benefi ts, which have increased due to 
the continuous increase of registered unemployed. The unemployment benefi ts 
themselves are also very low and should be revised.
The new Government may be exposed to growing pressures from diﬀ erent categories 
of public employees to increase their salaries and which are likely to use the example 
of increase of salaries for the teaching staﬀ . Obviously, this will be impossible next 
year; however, in mid-term, the productivity and quality of public services will depend 
on the level of wages in the sector and they need to be increased.
In short-term it is very diﬃ  cult to apply any measures that would immediately 
stimulate individual entrepreneurship as the crisis still hinders the economic 
developments. However, creating fair business environment and eliminating 
“monopolies” are necessary to protect small and micro business that may serve 
as important sources of income for some households. Also, it is very important 
to eliminate the intermediary agents thriving currently on the trade of agricultural 
goods and reducing the income from agricultural activities of the households.
1 Draft Program for Economic Stabilisation and Revival of the Republic of Moldova for 2009-2011, http://mec.gov.md/node/1766
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9. Households’ consumption
In this chapter we analyze evolution of consumption, which reversed its long-term increasing trend 
even before the income started to decrease. This might refl ect the imperfection of data collection, 
but more probably it is the outcome of the generalised perception of the population about 
upcoming crisis with subsequent decrease in income. These perceptions are also proven by the 
trend in natural persons’ deposits at commercial banks that continue to increase at the beginning 
of the year. The chapter ends with an outlook for 2009 and 2010 and some challenges that need to 
be solved in order to stimulate consumption that in short term will be the main engine of economic 
growth.
Decreasing consumption – instant response to crisis
Households’ consumption which was the engine of the Moldovan economic growth for a long 
period reacted immediately to the fi rst signs of the global crisis and started decreasing already 
in the last quarter of 2008. This had a major impact on the GDP in 2009, contributing to its 
decline by 10.8% in the fi rst quarter and 9.3% in the second. It is very interesting that household 
consumption started to decline both according to National accounts and HBS data before the 
decline in the income of the population. Also, according to both of these data sources, the 
decrease in consumption started before the decrease in remittance (Chart 24).
Chart 24 Trends in households’ consumption and remittances (by Balance of Payments), 
y-on-y, %
Source: National Accounts, Balance of Payments
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These might suggest two things. Either there was an actual fall in real remittances and not only 
in the part of investments in the fi rst quarter, as it may be argued from the diﬀ erence in data 
from Balance of Payments and HBS. Or, there was a general awareness of the population about 
crisis, and especially of the families of migrants, who expected a fall in their salaries already 
in the end of 2008 and reacted with a preventive contraction in consumption and increased 
propensity to save, as suggested by the fall of consumption one quarter prior to the decline 
in remittances.
Both data from HBS and evolution of retail trade show a decrease in non-food products 
consumption, while the expenditures for food continued growing slightly in 2009. This is 
mirrored by the signifi cant decrease in imports of some categories of non-food goods (such 
as household appliances), the decrease of production and collected taxes. Therefore, we 
believe that it is necessary to analyze the possibility to stimulate the consumption of some of 
these goods through VAT decrease on some goods and services with elastic demand (such as 
computers, constructions). So far, the new Government has decided only to increase excises 
for some products. As the demand for the products considered for an increase in excises 
(fuel, tobacco, alcohol, cosmetics, luxury car) is inelastic, this should not reduce consumption 
signifi cantly.
In September 2009 a slowdown of the decline rate of retail trade was registered on annual 
basis. Taking in consideration that the base period was already aﬀ ected by the crisis and that 
in September Moldova actually entered the second year of crisis, this seemed to be a normal 
evolution. However, October data show a further and much deeper decrease in retail trade 
and services provided to the population, in line with the trends of main sources of income of 
the population. These trends have not been paralleled by the evolution of services rendered to 
population which has kept growing both in September and October.
Saving for the “worse day”
Awareness of the population about crisis eﬀ ects before the actual decrease in income is 
confi rmed by data on evolution of the bank deposits of natural persons that were still on rise 
at the beginning of the year, although their rate of growth slowed down. Further, the trend of 
the deposits followed the general trend of remittances with the most signifi cant fall in April that 
perfectly correlates with the drop in remittances (Chart 25). The stagnation of the rate of growth 
is explained both by the declining trend of remittances, but also by the political instability in the 
country that made population more worrisome and decreased the confi dence in banks, especially 
after the June bankruptcy of the Investprivatbank. However, over August and September, the 
confi dence in the banking system have been re-established and the deposits of the population 
continued to increase despite the further decrease in money transfers from abroad and the 
decline in the interest rate for deposits.
At the same time, in the context of decreasing and volatile income of the population, the 
consumer credit has decreased this year on average by 70% monthly y-o-y. The increase in 
consumer credit until April 2008 was a normal evolution in the context of increasing salaries 
and economic growth. However, the commercial banks reacted somewhat contradictory to the 
defl ation and NBM looser monetary policy measures and increased the interest rates during 
the fi rst semester (Chart 26). Only in July an opposite trend of the interest rates started to 
materialise.
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Chart 25 Evolution of remittances and natural persons’ deposits, y-o-y, %
Source: NBM
Chart 26 Evolution of consumer credit and interest rate for consumer credit 
Source: NBM
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Outlook for 2009 and 2010
As there is strong positive correlation between consumption and remittances, 
the forecasted decline in remittances by 35-40% in 2009 can result in a decrease 
of household consumption by around 16-17% in 2009. Taking into consideration 
the increase in social payments and increase in salaries in the budgetary sector at 
the beginning of this year, but also the increased propensity of not declaring the 
revenues from sales in crisis period, the net decrease in consumption may register 
values between 10% and 12% by the end of 2009. The slight increase in remittances 
expected for 2010 (around 5% based on IMF forecast for economic growth in 2010) 
may keep consumption stable in 2010 if no other measures will be undertaken by 
the Government in order to stimulate consumption.
The savings of the population, in the forms of deposits in commercial banks, most 
probably will continue to grow at a low positive rate this year, which might increase 
slightly in 2010 as a result of increase in remittances. 
Challenges ahead
Continuous decrease in consumption in 2009, especially for non-food goods (trade 
of non-foods has decreased by 10.4% in January – September) should be a major 
Governmental concern. In short run, the Government should act to stimulate 
consumption. Although, the decrease in budgetary revenues puts more pressure 
on the Government to look for additional revenues and brought forth the idea of 
increasing the VAT, this would only decrease consumption. On contrary, the decrease 
of VAT for some goods may stimulate consumption and should be considered by the 
new Government.
Also, the deduction of investments in durable goods of natural persons may increase 
consumption not only of these specifi c goods, but also complementary goods and 
services. 
The weak channels of transmission of the monetary policy keep interest rates 
high and make credits unaﬀ ordable for most of the population. The National Bank 
of Moldova should further orient its monetary policy to increase the crediting of 
the economy and consumers, but at reasonable interest rates, keeping track of 
infl ationary pressures. 
?
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This chapter is on the evolution of prices during 2009 and factors that contributed to diﬀ erent trends 
in January-August and September-October. The decrease in prices in the fi rst period was a short-
term eﬀ ect of the crisis, which has reversed and in mid-term Moldova will have infl ation rising again. 
However, as the infl ationary pressures are not so strong, the NBM should continue with a policy 
oriented towards the crediting of the economy, which it has failed to implement in 2009, despite 
monetary tools used actively in July.
Defl ation: an outcome of economic crisis
After many years of high infl ation (constantly exceeding the limits set by the NBM and agreed 
with IMF), for the fi rst time since independence Moldova has registered a signifi cant annual 
defl ation in 2009. The CPI started to decrease already by the end of 2008 at the early stage of 
economic crisis and led to an annual defl ation rate in April 2009 (Chart 27).
Chart 27 Annual infl ation rate (%)
Source: NBS
However, the prices’ trend was not homogenous during the year and two main stages in the 
evolution of prices may be identifi ed in 2009. During the fi rst stage, January-August, the prices 
were constantly decreasing due to:
Decrease in oil and oil derivatives prices. These prices have a sizable impact on the 
Consumers Price Index both directly (fuel has a signifi cant share in CPI) and through 
their impact on production costs. The price per barrel of oil in January-August 2009 
was twice lower that the price in 2008. Consequently, this made possible a general 
decrease of prices per economy.
?
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Defl ation in many of the European countries. That made a number of goods imported 
to Moldova much cheaper.
Signifi cant decrease in prices for agricultural products and foodstuﬀ . In the fi rst 
semester of the year the wholesale prices for agricultural production decreased 
by 46%. This was still an eﬀ ect of the serious drought of 2007 that contributed to 
an increase in prices in the fi rst semester of 2008 by over 50%. However, this is 
the most signifi cant drop in wholesale prices for agricultural products since 2000 
pointing to the diﬃ  culties and uncertain framework which farmers operate in. 
Consequently, the CPI for foodstuﬀ  products has decreased by 6.8% in ten months 
of the year, much more as compared to non-food and services. As result, the 
Industrial Price Index in the food industry decreased more than on average this 
year. 
The decrease in monetary mass paralleled the shrinking domestic demand and 
had its own major contribution to the decrease in prices over the whole period as 
the producers and retailers tried to get rid of their stocks through more attractive 
prices.
However, in September the defl ation trend reversed and the next two months Moldova registered 
high rates of monthly infl ation. The reasons are:
Industrial Prices Index that started increasing again in March. This obviously should 
have refl ected in the CPI for foodstuﬀ  and non-foodstuﬀ  products with a certain 
lag.
The reversal of defl ation trend in most of the European countries that made the 
imported goods more expensive again. In September 2009 infl ation was registered 
in 17 out of 27 EU member countries.
Administrative increase in tariﬀ s for transport services and some utilities in Chisinau 
in October. This measure was adopted due to the losses suﬀ ered by the companies 
operating in the sectors, which resulted in an overall increase of prices due to the 
large share of the population based in Chisinau. 
Defl ation is not an economically healthy phenomenon, but in case of Moldova it provided some 
opportunities for the Government this year. After many years of unsuccessful infl ation fi ghting 
by tightening monetary policy, in 2009 the NBM had the opportunity of applying a looser policy 
by decreasing the base interest rate and mandatory reserves maintained by commercial banks in 
national and foreign currency. However, the reaction was quite late. Despite continuous defl ation 
in the fi rst semester, NBM operated really signifi cant changes of the two monetary tools only in 
July (see more next chapter). 
Outlook
Defl ation trend seems to have suﬀ ered a relentless reversal and Moldova is likely to 
close the year with an annual infl ation of about 0-1%. Prices for foodstuﬀ  products 
will bring about the main contribution to the low infl ation but this mainly due to the 
evolutions in the beginning of the year. As regards 2010, expectations of increasing 
oil price and slight economic recovery in many EU and CIS countries will tend to 
push the prices upward. For 2010 we expect an end-year annual infl ation rate of 
4-5%. 
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Challenges ahead
Increasing prices may direct the NBM towards tightening the monetary policy. 
However, this should not be the case at it is already too tight in the current context. 
In 2010, infl ation still will be under control, so, the main task of the NBM should be 
to support further the real sector of the economy and ensure necessary conditions 
for crediting the economy at reasonable interest rates.
An important task for the new Government is to shorten the long value-chains in the 
trade with agricultural goods that is the cause of high prices of foodstuﬀ  products 
and a constant reason for complaints of the agricultural producers; sometimes they 
are even forced to sell their production at prices below the cost of production.
?
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1 1 .  M o n e t a r y  p o l i c y 
This chapter discusses the main actions undertaken by the National Bank of Moldova in 2009 
in order to mitigate the repercussions of the world fi nancial and economic crisis and how the 
monetary policy radically changed from tight to a loose one. The chapter explains why these 
actions did not bring the expected results and what are the main constraints aﬀ ecting the central 
bank’s monetary policy.  
From an illusionary tight policy to an illusionary loose policy
The monetary and foreign exchange policy of the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) for 2009 
was focused on keeping the end-year annual infl ation rate at 9.0%, with a possible deviation 
of +/- 1.0 percentage point. It is clear that when designing its policy in late 2008 the NBM did 
not expect the world fi nancial crisis to have a domestic impact of such a magnitude as it had in 
2009. The defl ation registered in April-August 2009 and the decrease in economy monetization 
since September 2009 made the NBM to change its focus to the stabilization of the economy. 
After gradually tightening its anti-infl ation policy in September 2007-May 2008, in 2009 the NBM 
gradually decreased its policy interest rate. 
But does the current level of NBM policy rates correlate with the infl ation trends? An optimal 
monetary policy rate should be 4 p.p. above the annual infl ation, according to the central bank’s 
oﬃ  cials1. However, since September 2008 the gap between the annual CPI index and policy rate 
has only increased. This means that although NBM attempted to relax its monetary policy (as 
Chart 28 illustrates), in real terms the monetary policy became much tighter (Chart 29). 
Chart 28 Evolution of the monetary aggregate M3 and CPI (M/M-12) and NBM refi nancing rate, %
Source: NBM, NBS, EG calculations
1 http://logos.press.md/Weekly/Main.asp?IssueNum=817&IssueDate=11.09.2009&YearNum=33&Theme=3&Topic=25834.
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Chart 29 NBM refi nancing rate and average annual CPI index, %
Source: NBM, NBS, EG calculations
NBM’ attempts to eﬀ ectively relax its monetary policy were undermined by the defl ationary 
trends. We believe that in 2008-2009 NBM took a too conservative approach regarding its 
monetary policy. NBM needed four months in 2009 to be completely sure that infl ation is subdued 
and during this period it kept the policy rate unchanged despite the decreasing CPI index. Its 
reluctance can be explained to some extent by the speculative attacks on national currency in 
February-March 2009 and by the elections campaign. A consequence of the NBM exaggerate 
prudence was the decrease in economy monetization which undermined even more the economic 
growth by restraining crediting activity. Chart 30 illustrates the positive correlation between the 
real policy rate and real interest rate on credits in national currency and the negative correlation 
with the credits growth.
Chart 30 Evolution of real monetary policy rate, real interest rate and annual growth rate 
for credits in national currency, %
Source: NBM, NBS, EG calculations 
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Switching from money sterilisation to liquidity provision
When the global fi nancial crisis set on in September 2008 the decrease in monetary mass in 
Moldova accelerated (Chart 31). Refuelling the economic system with additional liquidities became 
a priority for the NBM only gradually during 2009. Unlike other countries in the region, only the 
economy’s real sector felt a shortage of liquidities, whereas the banking system in Moldova fared 
well in terms of liquidity indicators.
Chart 31 Evolution of annual indicators of monetary aggregates, seasonally adjusted, %
Source: NBM
Since April 2009 the NBM has not used its certifi cates as sterilization tool anymore and has only 
provided liquidity through REPO operations and direct loans to commercial banks. The fi rst 
instrument has been used mainly from May to July and helped injecting MDL 346 million in the 
banking system. In March-September 2009 the NBM has provided also MDL 1389.1 million direct 
credits to commercial banks at its refi nancing rate. The main condition was for the banks to 
further channel these resources into the real sector with a maximum margin of 5 p.p.
Additionally, NBM decreased the obligatory reserves rate which oﬀ ered commercial banks the 
possibility to free up more resources for crediting activities. The obligatory reserve rate for 
attracted resources decreased from 22.0% in September 2008 to a record low level of 8.0%, both 
for national currency, fully convertible and non-convertible currencies. 
Foreign exchange market – looking for the “right” exchange rate
Since the beginning of 2009 until September 2009 the national currency depreciated against 
USD by 8.3% and against EURO by 16.8%. During this period of time the internal foreign exchange 
market faced many challenges which created depreciation pressures on the Moldovan Leu. 
Besides objective factors which led to the decrease in foreign currency infl ows and, respectively, 
decrease in demand for national currency (decrease in remittances, exports and FDIs), there 
were factors related to investors’ and consumers’ downwards anticipations. They had a dramatic 
impact during the electoral fever, when a massive speculation fuelled the negative anticipations 
against national currency. 
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These depreciation trends are, also, revealed by the evolution of the real eﬀ ective exchange rate 
(REER). During the fi rst semester of 2009, REER depreciated by 15.2 p.p., from 133.1% to 117.9%, 
which denotes the depreciation of the Moldovan national currency in comparison with its main 
trading partners1. 
Chart 32 Evolution of the ratio offi cial reserve assets/imports for 3 consecutive months
Source: NBM, NBS, EG calculations
Given the NBM commitment to keep the national currency stable, during the fi rst months of 
2009 it made historically high interventions on the foreign exchange market by selling its oﬃ  cial 
reserve assets in order to meet the increased demand for foreign currency. During January-
April 2009 the total amount of foreign currency sold was equivalent USD 513.7 million. These 
massive interventions were not welcomed by a major part of the economic analysts for two 
main reasons: fi rst, sterilization of these currency interventions had negative eﬀ ects on the 
economy monetization (Chart 31); second, keeping the national currency stable was made at the 
expense of the central bank’s oﬃ  cial reserve assets, which decreased in volume by 34.1% from 
January to April 2009. While the fi rst reason for concern was fully justifi ed, the second one was 
not. According to an internationally accepted and IFM-backed norm, the optimal level of oﬃ  cial 
reserve assets should not be lower than the imports volume for three consecutive months. As 
Chart 32 clearly shows, the central bank’s interventions did not aﬀ ect negatively the optimal level 
of its international reserves.
Outlook for 2010
It is likely that NBM will continue to relax prudently its monetary policy, by 
decreasing the refi nancing and obligatory reserves rates. This will contribute to 
the increase in economy monetization.
As a result of anticipated increase in exports, remittances and FDIs for 2010, the 
oﬃ  cial reserve assets will also go up, which will strengthen the NBM’s position to 
keep the national currency stable.
1 National Bank of Moldova, Quarterly publications
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We expect that the real interest rates for credits in 2010 will decrease which will 
contribute to the increase in crediting the economy’s real sector. 
Main challenges
Despite the fact that the NBM’s refi nancing rate was set in September 2009 at 
the minimal historical level of 5%, it remains quite high in real terms. Taking into 
account that the interest rates applied to the central bank’s loans to commercial 
banks equals its policy rate, it will continue to create constraints for the crediting 
the economy’s real sector. Respectively, NBM have to continue relaxing its monetary 
policy given the defl ation trends and the necessity to stimulate the real sector’s 
crediting. However, this measure should not only lead to the increase in the liquidity 
indicators within the banking system. It is crucial that commercial banks invest 
their resources in programs for fi nancing the economy. Otherwise, the continuous 
decrease in the monetary policy rates with almost no immediate impact on the 
economy, can lead to a boomerang eﬀ ect in the near future. For instance, it can 
result in massively fl ooding the economy with liquidities and such a sharp increase 
in the monetary mass could immediately boost the infl ation to dangerous levels. 
The lack of population’ and investors’ confi dence in the national currency serves 
as another key policy issue and challenge which the NBM’s foreign exchange policy 
should deal with. Chart 31 denotes that since April 2009 the annual indicator 
for monetary aggregate M0 constantly exceeds M2 which is associated with 
the decrease in the amount of time deposits denominated in national currency. 
This phenomenon makes the issue related to the shortage of long money in the 
Moldovan economy even more acute.
?
?
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1 2 .  B u d g e t a r y  p o l i c y
This chapter describes the main trends related to public fi nances which were infl uenced by 
economic crisis, as well as by the political situation in 2009. It analyzes the budgetary policy which 
on the revenues side was infl uenced by the shrinking internal and external demand and on the 
expenditures side by the electoral behavior of the Government. There is also a discussion of the 
methods used to fi nance the increased budgetary defi cit and of the possible eﬀ ects of an austere 
budgetary policy. This chapter highlights the challenges which the Government will face in short-
term. 
General overview
Our statement in MEGA #1 that public fi nances are a mirror of the country’s economic and political 
situation remains valid. The data on national public budget execution perfectly reveals the fi rst 
signals of the world fi nancial crisis and the inappropriate reaction of the previous Government 
(Chart 33). 
Chart 33 Annual indicators of budgetary revenues and expenditures, %
Source: Ministry of Finance, EG calculations;
Starting with October 2008 the budgetary indicators registered a sluggish decline, followed 
by a sharp collapse starting with January 2009. Taking into account that public revenues in 
Moldova depend mainly on household’s fi nal consumption, the shrink in internal demand had 
dramatic eﬀ ects on the national public budget. At the same time, the Government driven 
by electoral interests did not renounce to its pre-electoral promises and even made more 
promises. As a result of the increase in pensions and wages in the public sector, the public 
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expenditures also increased from the beginning of 2009. The discrepancy between public 
revenues and expenditures led to an uncontrolled budgetary defi cit which in the 1st semester 
2009 accounted for 7.5% of GDP.
Consumers as main source of budgetary revenues
During the past several years the reliance of the budget on households’ consumption continually 
increased as revealed by the increasing share of indirect taxes (VAT, excises and custom duties) 
in total public revenues. Their share increased more prominently after the introduction of zero 
corporate income tax since January 2008. While in 2007 the share of indirect taxes in budgetary 
revenues was 57.5% and of direct taxes – 20.9%, in 2008 indirect taxes made already 62.5% of total 
revenues and direct taxes only 13%1. This model of budgetary revenues formation preserved in 
2009 (Chart 34) and with a recent Governmental decision to keep the zero rate on CIT until 2012, 
it is unlikely that this model will change in the near future.
Chart 34 Budgetary revenues structure, % of total
Source: MinFin, EG calculations
The share of fi scal revenues in GDP decreased during the 1st semester 2009 until 32.6%, which was 
mainly caused by the shrink in fi nal consumption. As Chart 35 illustrates, the revenues generated 
by indirect taxes were much more aﬀ ected by the world economic crisis which had a dramatic 
infl uence on total budgetary revenues and budgetary defi cit. 
1 The calculations were based on the Public National Budget, except social and medical insurance contributions.
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Chart 35 Annual growth of direct and indirect taxes, %
Source: MinFin, EG calculations
Public expenditures: who will pay for the Government’s myopia?
Given the continuously decreasing public revenues, the fi rst measure which should have been 
immediately undertaken by the Government in order to mitigate the increase in budgetary defi cit 
was to reassess its expenditures policy. First of all it concerns public expenditures on social and 
cultural projects which traditionally form the major part of total budgetary expenditures (Chart 
36). However, the Government did not cut its social expenditures but rather decreased its 
economic expenditures (Chart 37). 
Chart 36 Structure of budgetary expenditures, %
Source: MinFin, EG calculations
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Chart 37 Evolution of budgetary social and economic expenditures, real terms, mil. MDL
Source: Ministry of Finance and EG calculations;
Moreover, in light of the approaching April 2009 parliamentary elections, the Government 
increased even more its social expenditures despite decreasing its revenues. It increased the 
pensions by 20% instead of the legally required 15 indexation1 and promised wage increases for 
public employees. With this budgetary myopia, the Government spent the budgeted resources 
for several months ahead. Covering these “budgetary black holes” was possible only by issuing 
state treasury bills, which intensifi ed since May. Obviously, the bill for such a charity, sooner 
or later, should be paid and that is the point where the real problems begin. As of the end of 
September 2009 the budgetary defi cit reached MDL 2750.2 million and the defi cit could double by 
the end of 2009. This makes diﬃ  cult to keep the budgetary defi cit at the level of 9% of GDP as new 
Government promised. Even more, it is practically impossible unless external sources of fi nancing 
budgetary defi cit are identifi ed.
Bankers’ patriotism as a source for fi nancing budgetary defi cit
Main investors in state securities in Moldova are the commercial banks, and in 2009 they became 
the main creditors of the Government for fi nancing the increasing budgetary defi cit. Chart 38 
reveals that since March 2009 internal sources of fi nancing started to be intensively used for 
covering a part of budgetary defi cit. However, the most prominent increase in revenues from 
issuing state treasury bills was registered since May 2009, with the total volume of transactions 
increasing from MDL 154.3 million (April 2009) to MDL 418.5 million. 
1 According to the Law on state socially insured pensions, the pensions are indexed annually on the date of 1 April. The indexation coeﬃ  -
cient is determined based on the average between annual CPI and average wage growth rate. 
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Chart 38 Evolution of budgetary defi cit and sources of fi nancing Sep’08-Sep’09, MDL million
Source: MinFin
Taking into account the cost of domestic capital, much higher than in other countries, as well 
as shortage of long-term investment resources in the economy, we consider such a form of 
fi nancing as quite dangerous for Moldova. Most of the treasury bills are issued with a 91 and 
182-days maturity, which means that the revenues earned from such securities can be used only 
for fi nancing some temporary cash defi cits. On the one hand, the Government cannot use these 
resources for fi nancing some long-term infrastructural projects and used this type of borrowing 
for fi nancing part of its social protection policy and paying wages to public workers. On the 
other hand, the Government has permanently to seek for funds in order to repay these debts. 
The increase in domestic public debt with so short repayment periods and contracting public 
revenues will create soon signifi cant pressures on the budget.
This policy of using internal sources for fi nancing budgetary defi cit was supported by the NBM 
monetary policy. The refi nancing rate and required reserves rates decreased from 10.0% and 
17.5% in June 2009 until 5.0% and 8.0% in September 2009 and this made possible for commercial 
banks to use more resources for crediting the Government. Because of the high risks in almost all 
economic sectors, banks believed that the state is the most secure debtor and they did not harry 
to provide loans to private companies or consumers.
Outlook for 2010
It is certain that in 2010 the Government will implement a more austere budgetary 
policy. The only measure to maximize the budgetary revenues will be the increase 
in excises for several commodities (for fuel by 7.5%, tobacco - 10%, alcoholic 
beverages - 4%, cosmetics - 15% and luxury cars - 20%). With the budgetary base not 
likely to widen signifi cantly, this will create signifi cant pressures on the budgetary 
expenditures policy which will be less expansive during 2010. 
The recently agreed memorandum with IMF will make much easier to attract 
external resources from many creditors and donors and this will mitigate the 
pressures on the national public budget. It will make the Government to rely more 
intensively on external sources instead of internal ones for fi nancing the budgetary 
defi cit. 
?
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Challenges ahead
The fundamental challenge for the end of 2009 and during 2010 will be keeping the 
budgetary defi cit within the limits agreed with IMF (9% of GDP in 2009 and 7% of 
GDP in 2010). The main function of the austere budgetary policy will be taking the 
budgetary defi cit under control. 
The increasing sales of state treasury bills during May-September 2009 will create 
signifi cant pressures on the state budget already at the end of current year, due 
to their short repayment period. Therefore, a major challenge for the Government 
will consist in identifying external sources for fi nancing the state budget. 
The Government committed to cut 4000 staﬀ  units of employees in the public 
sector. This creates two problems: a spike in unemployment rate and political costs. 
It is extremely important that this optimization is a fair one (targeting increased 
eﬃ  ciency and professionalism rather than political loyalty) and accompanied by 
streamlined business environment so that human resources redundant in public 
sector are channeled in the private one and not migrate.
As a result of the expected increase in the state external debt, a major challenge 
for the Government will be to avoid any shocks related to the exchange rate which 
would increase the burden of external debt on the economy. 
In 2010 Government will have to combine its economic policy focused on economic 
growth with better social protection. In this context better means socially fair (i.e. 
targeting the poorest and the most vulnerable). The Government will have to strike 
the right balance between social and economic expenditures, while keeping the 
budgetary defi cit under control.
With the CIT planned to be reintroduced only in 2012, the narrow tax base at 
local level and high fi scal centralization will remain important issues unless more 
consequent actions are undertaken by the Government. For instance, it can 
reintroduce the practice of VAT sharing with local governments. Additionally, it can 
increase the property tax which could become a more important own source for 
local budgets1. It is also necessary to improve the regulatory framework that will 
oﬀ er local governments clear possibilities to borrow long-term loans on the capital 
market.
1  According to the situation from September 2009, the share of property tax revenues in total local public revenues except 
transfers from the central government represented 8.9%
?
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The current chapter is focused on the analysis of the last evolutions in the banking system. Main 
issues are studied based on the available statistical data, national and regional research reports 
and comparative analysis for the current trends. What needs to be stressed is that all three 
markets were aﬀ ected by the current economic crisis and are in the process of overcoming the 
diﬃ  culties. The analysis provided the necessary understanding of the challenges ahead on all 
three markets. 
Structural changes and trends in the banking system
The global fi nancial crisis has indirectly aﬀ ected the banking system in Moldova. Moldovan banks 
have had limited access to international capital markets and thus limited possibility to raise 
cheap funds in the previous years. As result, Moldovan banks were not subject to large outfl ows 
like other countries’ in the region. However, the signifi cant reduction of remittances and the 
corresponding economic stagnation could not go by without a negative impact on the domestic 
banking system. Domestic currency deposits declined by around 25% in nominal terms between 
December 2008 and June 2009, while foreign currency deposits have remained relatively stable, 
refl ecting concerns about the prospects of the domestic currency and declining remittances. Main 
indicators of the banking sector also register a lower performance and a higher concentration of 
the sector (Table 2).
Table 2 Moldova main banking system indicators, Q1-Q3’09, %
Q1 Q2 Q3
Depth of the banking system
Total banking assets/GDP 29 12 N/A
Lending/GDP 19 8 N/A
Deposits/GDP 20 9 N/A 
Concentration
Equity/Total banking system 63 65 64 
Total assets/Total banking system 64 67 68 
Ownership as a ratio of assets
Subsidiaries of foreign banks 21 22 22 
Capital adequacy ratio 31 33 32 
Dollarization
Foreign currency loans/Total loans 41 45 45 
Foreign currency deposits/Total deposits 53 57 55 
Source: NBM and EG calculations  
The stability of the banking system is aﬀ ected by the current economic situation of the country. A 
number of risks infl uence the banking system and in particular the credit risk, also known as the 
risk of deterioration of the banking assets. According to the NBM data the quality of the loans 
portfolio of the banking system has worsened during the fi rst three quarters of 2009, with the 
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weight of the non-performing loans (NPL) in the total capital increasing from 29% in March up to 
50% in September. Same negative trends registered the weight of the non-performing assets in 
the total capital and the weight of total NPL in the total loans (Chart 39). Similar evolutions have 
been remarked in most countries in the region, although the share of NPL in total loans did not 
overpass 5%.
Chart 39 Share of non-performing loans and assets in the banking system, % 
Source: NBM and EG calculations
As a result of accumulating non-performing loans the profi tability ratios also registered signifi cant 
negative trends (Chart 40). Just by looking at the evolution of such a key indicator as Net Interest 
Margin, it can be noticed the signifi cant decrease from 6.08% in September 2008 to 4.23 in the 
same month this year. Both ROA and ROE have collapsed in 2009. As a result the banks became 
much more restrictive and cautious when extending loans. 
Chart 40 Evolution of the profi tability ratio of the banking system, % (Q1-Q3’08 and Q1-Q3’09)
Source: NBM and EG calculations
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Thus the share of total loans in the total assets continued a decreasing trend from 66% in March 
2008 to 58% in September 2009, while the share of the foreign currency loans in the total loans 
increased from 40% in September 2008 to 45% in the same period this year (Chart 41). 
Chart 41 Share of foreign currency loans in total loans in % (Q1-Q3’08 and Q1-Q3’09) 
Source: NBM and EG calculations 
Many companies, mainly from constructions, industry and trade suﬀ ered important losses during 
the current economic crisis and became incapable to reimburse the contracted loans, thus placing 
a signifi cant strain on the banks’ lending activity. In order to promote the lending activity the NBM 
took a number of actions, including the reduction in September this year of the obligatory reserve 
requirements from 20% of capital to 8% and of the interest rates from 20% to 7%. In May 2009 the 
NBM announced a program of funding to Moldovan banks for terms up to 12 months at the base 
rate to provide liquidity and support lending to the real economy. At the same time the NBM 
eﬀ ected important amendments to a number of prudent regulations and standard acts, while 
the Banking Association of Moldova developed and proposed a draft law on amending certain 
legislative acts, in particular the Execution Code of the Republic of Moldova, the Insolvency Law, 
the Penal Code of the Republic of Moldova and the Law on fi nancial institutions.
Banks hold the necessary sources for covering the potential future requirements. In 2009 
Moldovan banks have been very prudent and ran capital adequacy ratios of over 30%, although 
the minimum required level is 12%; and maintained the liquidity level of more than 20% which 
is required by the prudent standards (Chart 42). The black spot on this rosy picture is the 
InvestprivatBank commercial bank, which entered an orderly liquidation procedure in June 2009 
and all its deposits were transferred to the state-owned Banca de Economii commercial bank. 
The NBM pulled InvestprivatBank’s license not because it ran out of money, but because its 
owners had been using the bank’s assets for real estate investment funds and were fried when 
the market collapsed.
Total bank deposits amounted to MDL 24.9 billion as of September 30, 2009 registering a 8.5% 
decrease as compared with December 31, 2008. The weight of natural person’s deposits in total 
deposits also followed a decreasing trend amounting, with 62.6% in September this year compared 
to 64% during the same period last year. The interest rates followed a decreasing trend as well 
beginning with the second quarter of this year after reaching a peak in March (Chart 43).  
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Chart 42 Liquidity trends in % (fi rst three quarters of 2009)
Source: NBM and EG calculations
Chart 43 Evolution of the interest rates 
Source: NBM and EG calculations 
It can be noticed that the loans weight in total assets also was higher during the fi rst quarter 
of this year and continued a slowdown after March, although it should have been vice-versa: 
as the interest rates decrease the loans volume should increase. The current situation is due 
to the slowdown of the overall real economy and as a result of the decrease of the number 
of extended loans, in particular due to the more restrictive requirements for the extension of 
loans. 
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Outlook for 2010
In 2010 fi nancial markets are expected to begin the process of recovering from 
the current economic crisis. The named recovery depends to a large extent on 
the political situation given the confi dence of both national and international 
investors. Actors of the banking sector will look for new opportunities to augment 
their services portfolio in order to achieve higher levels of profi tability and mitigate 
the potential risks.
Challenges ahead
The world fi nancial crisis and the current economic crisis equally aﬀ ected the 
Moldovan fi nancial system. The decreasing trends of all main indicators, including 
of lending and profi tability ratios of the banking system is a direct result of the 
named impact. It is necessary for Moldova to have in place a fi nancial early warning 
system, which would allow taking preventive actions before the new eventual crisis 
occurs in the future.
?
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This chapter looks at how Moldova’s foreign trade evolved in 2009 and how global fi nancial crisis 
impacted it. It also attempts to see if and how the fundamental trends observed in the preceding 
decade have changed as the response to the crisis and where the future challenges may lie. 
The foreign trade in crisis…
As the global fi nancial and economic turmoil started to unfold, a certain number of Moldovan 
economic analysts and observers anticipated (despite the former Government’s “no-crisis-in-
sight” stance) the crisis to aﬀ ect Moldovan economy not via fi nancial contagion, but via down-
to-earth real economy mechanisms. Specifi cally, slump in foreign demand for Moldovan goods 
would bring down Moldovan exports resulting in less profi t (if any) for local companies and less 
work and income for local workers, which coupled with dwindling remittances would result in 
contraction of the domestic demand pushing Moldovan economy still deeper under water. The 
developments that followed gave credence to this view.
The almost freefall in exports and imports (see Chart 44) outlined the exposure of Moldovan 
economy to the external risks and pressures as well as oﬀ ered better understanding of what 
the famous phrase “small and open economy” means. It is worthwhile to mention that exports 
felt the brunt of the crisis before the imports. Initially the internal demand held up better and 
decline in imports was not as steep as that of exports. The resilience of the imports is even 
more surprising if we take into account the plunge in exports. However, further on the speed 
of fall in imports became much stronger with signs of tentative recovery shaping up only in 
September. 
Chart 44 Monthly evolution of Moldovan exports and imports, %, y-o-y
Source: NBS.
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Exports have remained euro-bound...
The eﬀ ects of the crisis translated swiftly in the fall in external demand resulting in a considerable 
slide in Moldovan exports in January-September of 25.1% y-o-y. The crisis, nonetheless, has not 
aﬀ ected the recent trend of the geographical reorientation of Moldovan exports towards the 
European market. Thus, in January-September, 2009, the share of exports going to the EU market 
increased while that of CIS markets declined (Chart 45). In a way, crisis spurred the “reorientation” 
trend since it had hit the economies of the CIS countries much harder. The use of ATPs granted 
by the EU has further supported this trend. During the fi rst three quarters of 2009 Moldovan 
exporters fully used the quotas provided by EU for wine and wheat, while the sugar quotas were 
used by almost 90% and quotas for maize by 98.5%. Given that the second year in a row since ATPs 
were granted Moldovan exporters managed to fully use the quotas well before the end of the 
year Moldovan authorities should try to promote the idea of more considerable annual increases 
in the quotas than initially envisaged.
At the same time composition of the exports changed as the result of the crisis: the balance 
signifi cantly tilted towards agri-food exports. Non-agricultural exports, especially metals, 
appeared main victims as the demand and prices plunged in the wake of the global fi nancial crisis. 
The Chart 46 may conceal part of the picture, though. Even most of the categories that expanded 
its share decreased in absolute terms (with notable exception of vegetal products), including 
such major exports as textiles and foodstuﬀ s. 
Policy issues 
Although EU market as a whole has entrenched its position, Romania - a top destination for 
Moldovan exports - in recent times lost some ground in the face of Russian market. Thus, in the 
fi rst eight months of the year Moldovan exports to Romania declined by 30.3%, the slide that 
was exceeded only by exports to Ukraine (-48.4%) and Poland (-48.9%). The shrinking share of 
Romanian market was swiftly explained by the political reasons since former Moldovan authorities 
introduced visa regime for Romanian citizens in the aftermath of the civil unrest that followed 
general election from April this year.
However, this was not the fi rst time when Russia’s share superseded that of Romania. On the 
quarterly basis the similar development was observed in the last quarter of last year (visas not 
yet introduced) and the second quarter of the current year (visas just introduced). Thus we have 
two instances, where “visa” factor had no infl uence and another one when it hypothetically 
could infl uence bilateral trade, however, it remains quite doubtful whether these eﬀ ects 
could kick in so fast as to suspend the export contracts between Romanian and Moldovan 
companies.  
Perhaps, the political tensions indeed created quite an unfavourable environment for trade 
between these two countries; nonetheless, there are more reasons to this development than 
meets the eye.  The structure of exports to Romania turned out to be major weakness in the time 
of crisis. The textiles, footwear and metals held major shares in the Moldovan exports to Romania 
(the very exports that suﬀ ered considerably on the aggregate level), and they declined by 23.5%, 
47.7% and 79.5% respectively in case of Romania. On the contrary, such exports as machinery and 
equipment, oilseeds and sugar exports going to Romanian market increased at the background 
of the overall decline in exports. The exports to Russian Federation are mostly composed of 
agricultural exports, which as we saw proved to be more resilient in the crisis’ aftermath and this 
also helped Russia to overcome Romania on the top of the export destinations for Moldovan 
goods.
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Chart 45 Geographical distribution of Moldovan exports, Jan–Aug 2008-2009
Source: NBS
Chart 46 Composition of Moldovan exports, Jan-Aug 2008-2009
Source: NBS
Shrinking imports: the suddenly frugal consumers…
Apparently, the impact of crisis on imports was much more severe. As it was mentioned initially 
the imports resisted better the crisis pressures, so more spectacular was their further fall. In 
the fi rst nine months of 2009 the imports dwindled by 37.8% on annual basis (with strong signs 
of recovery in September: monthly expansion of 22.3%), being massively pulled down by falling 
internal demand as both companies and citizens’ incomes (remittances) stumbled. The fall in 
imports was determined not only by frugality of Moldovan companies and households, but also 
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by cheapening of such imports as petrol and derivative products (which translated in lower import 
volume fi gures). The fall in imports was wide-spread with all categories taking the hit, however, 
mostly aﬀ ected appeared mineral products, machinery and equipment, transport vehicles and 
metals, showing that both corporate and personal demand remarkably sagged in the aftermath 
of the crisis.
As opposite to the exports, the decline in imports was slightly stronger with respect to EU producers 
than with those from the CIS. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that geographical distribution 
of imports remained largely balanced despite the crisis, with notable exception of Kazakhstan, 
whose ascendance is easily explained by the fact that natural gas imported in Moldova this year 
originated from this country (in previous years it originated from Russian Federation). It is also 
noticeable that imports from Romania reduced considerably, but this mostly goes down to the 
fact that petrol and its derivative products are mostly imported in Moldova from this country. 
The precipitous decline of imports also led to an improbable evolution in the balance of Moldovan 
trade: the shrinking trade defi cit. Indeed, imports fell much stronger than exports and that led to 
almost halving trade defi cit in January-August on yearly basis. 
Outlook for 2010
The recovery of foreign trade fl ows will most likely remain sluggish and highly 
dependent on speed of convalescence of global economy. The outlook for main 
Moldovan trade partners remains rather unpromising: it is highly improbable 
the main CIS economies and Romania will boast again high growth rates in the 
near-term future meaning that demand for Moldovan goods will remain subdued. 
Overall, we can expect that exports will shrink this year by 20-25% range, with some 
improvements by the end of the year. If the current external economic environment 
persists Moldovan exports are set for a rather slow recovery in 2010;
The imports continue its decline because of falling demand (sagging remittances, 
worsened credit conditions, less business investment). Nonetheless, in the 
forthcoming months this tendency may be somewhat corrected due to reversals 
in pricing trend for some imported commodities. The eventual pick-up in private 
consumption and business investment may see a surprising turn-around in imports. 
At the moment our expectations regarding consumption remain quite conservative 
so the imports are poised to climb up at a slow pace.  
Challenges ahead
With global economy setting more or less fi rmly on the recovery path the outlook 
for the sector looks increasingly brighter in comparison with the beginning of the 
year. It is quite reasonable to expect the external demand to get more robust with 
the eventual turnaround in remittances infl ow helping heal the domestic demand. 
Nonetheless, this recovery will perhaps be quite sluggish, save the ‘double-dip’ 
recession is avoided. Hence, expect only modest upturn in Moldovan foreign 
trade;
These conservative estimates should not dishearten, though. They simply put 
more emphasis on the arduous tasks in front of the new government to promote 
institutional reform and ‘free’ the foreign trade. The Doing Business 2010 report 
released this year outline once more the lack of progress in the “trading across 
borders” area in Moldova. The indicators gauging the fi nancial and time costs for 
export-imports operation have been still for a couple of years in the row;
?
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The hurdles for exports and imports are not however limited to customs area. 
They also abound beyond borders. Both exporters and importers are subject to 
a series of oﬃ  cial and less oﬃ  cial payments which ultimately either diminishes 
international competitiveness of Moldovan goods or simply digs too deep into 
consumer’s pocket. Therefore, institutional reforms in this area will be critical for 
magnifying eﬀ ects of global economic recovery for Moldovan economy through 
enhanced international competitiveness and stronger domestic demand;
On the external policy front the task is to come well prepared at the negotiations of 
the eventual free trade agreement with the EU. At the same time, the possibility of 
enhancing ATP quotas for some goods should not be put aside in the short-term;
On domestic front, the institutional reform should not focus exclusively on the 
import ‘monopolies’. It should put a special emphasis on preparing Moldovan 
economy for convergence with the European “one”. In trade this means foremost 
the capacity to withstand competitive pressures of common market. The long and 
diﬃ  cult road starts with some trivial (albeit still unaccomplished) stuﬀ  like sanitary 
standards and fi nishes with more sophisticated one as competition policy and 
state aid. In order to plead for deep and comprehensive convergence, Moldova 
has to show will and capacity to implement simpler things ... and this is the place 
to start.
?
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This fi nal chapter tries to assess the main evolutions on the main global commodity markets in the 
aftermath of the global fi nancial turmoil. It also tries to dissect main fundamental and speculative 
factors that determined these evolutions. Finally, it looks how the situation on the market will evolve 
as economic recovery starts taking hold. 
Main commodities: on a fi rmer ground
In the beginning of 2009 the jitters throughout the main commodity markets continued. The 
global economic slowdown coupled with debacle on the fi nancial market led to overall slide on 
the commodity markets as demand shrank and investors fl ed the markets. At the same time by 
February-March the upward trend became obvious as signs of an eventual recovery supported by 
fi scal and monetary stimuli worldwide started emerging (Chart 47, Chart 48). Furthermore, the 
recovery of demand was coupled with the supply-side policies put forward by main producers 
aimed at maintaining (such as OPEC in oil sector) or scaling back current production levels (metal 
producers). 
Chart 47 Oil price (Brent), Jan-Oct 2009, USD/barrel
Source: US Energy Information Administration.
Therefore, the fl uctuations of the commodity prices were determined both by the fundamental 
and speculative factors and thus remained inherently volatile throughout the period.
1 5 .  G l o b a l  m a r k e t s
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Chart 48 . Evolution of main commodity indexes, Jan–Oct, 2009
Note: Commodity Metals Price Index includes Copper, Aluminium, Iron Ore, Tin, Nickel, Zinc, 
Lead, and Uranium Price Indices; Commodity Fuel (energy) Index includes Crude oil (petroleum), 
Natural Gas, and Coal Price Indices; Commodity Food Price Index includes Cereals, 
Vegetable Oils, Meat, Seafood, Sugar, Bananas, and Oranges Price Indices; 2005 = 100. 
Source: IMF.
The oil prices after a signifi cant upward leap of 40% in May-June, have then apparently stabilized 
at the level of 65-75 USD per barrel (Brent). However, these price increases are strongly 
supported by wide-spread expectation of the approaching economic recovery, while the demand 
remained quite sluggish throughout the period at the background of expanding supply (mostly 
non-OPEC driven). At the same time the OPEC producers repeatedly demonstrated their will to 
resist pressures aimed at spurring oil production and opined that prices of 70-80 USD per barrel 
would not imperil the economic recovery. Furthermore, the advances in oil prices were helped 
by weakening US dollar. 
The higher prices at the global oil market swiftly translated into price hikes for petrol on Moldovan 
markets in 2009. After two consecutive reductions in February and March the price for 1 litre 
of petrol (A95) reached level of 8.80 MDL. However, as the oil prices rebounded on the global 
market, the domestic petrol prices rose three times in a row reaching 11.85 MDL per litre by 
August-September. 
The evolution on the metal markets closely resembled that on oil market, though with a slower 
recovery (Chart 48). Demand remained feeble throughout the period on the most markets, while 
drop on most major markets being partly oﬀ set by the growing demand in China (+19%) and India 
(+8.9%). The global demand in 2009 is estimated to be down by 8.6% on yearly basis, with the fall 
in EU and Romania (main markets for Moldovan metals) of 32.6% and 43.2%, respectively. The CIS 
demand has also been in freefall (-30.8%).
The fall in food and agricultural commodities was much milder than on other markets and 
conversely the recovery started in the beginning of the year was less buoyant. As with the 
other commodity markets the price developments were determined by both fundamental and 
speculative factors. Fundamental factors at play are: strong global demand for food, high level of 
supply of majority of cereals and more or less favourable weather conditions in many producing 
countries. All these factors keep the prices higher than in pre-boom 2007-2008 years, however 
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lower than peaks of 2008. Furthermore, the high food prices are supported by rebounding oil prices 
due to oil inputs (such as fuel and fertilizers) as well as use of corn for bio-ethanol production. 
Thus, cheaper oil (in comparison with peaks of 2008) also added to downward pressure on the 
food prices as well as on the bio-ethanol producers. 
Speculative factors, as in the commodity markets, have also contributed to the increased volatility 
in the agri-food commodities’ prices. The expectations of the global economic recovery as well as 
US dollar depreciation have helped prices rebound.
Outlook for 2009
The trend of more expensive oil will hold up through the end of this year and the 
next year. Recently, International Energy Agency revised up its estimates for oil 
demand in 2009 and 2010, by 200 kb/d for and 350 kb/d, respectively. As a result, 
price forecasts were also revised upwards. Thus, the International Monetary Fund 
expects the oil price for 2010 of 76.5 USD comparing to 61.53 USD in 2009 (assumed 
price based on future markets).
As global demand started picking up in the second half of the year, the World Steel 
Association expects brighter outlook for the next year on the metal markets. The 
global demand is expected to rebound by 9.2% in 2010. 
For the rest of 2009 and 2010 the trends on the agrifood markets will more or less 
be the same as in the middle of this year. Thus, Food and Agriculture Organization 
expects prices to stay above pre-2006 years or even a new surge in prices like the 
one seen in 2007-08 appears to be a “realistic possibility”. There are signifi cant 
unknowns or upward risks, such as weather condition, oil prices, US dollar 
exchange rate, biofuel demand, etc. Another important risk is decision by many 
farmers to reduce the wheat sowings as result of the lower wheat prices this year, 
the trend easy to observe in Moldova too. Combined with the steadily growing 
demand it is reasonable to expect that most of the agrifood commodities will 
remain at least at the 2009 second half price level. 
Challenges ahead
The recovery of fuel prices bodes no well for import-bound Moldovan economy since 
it will lead to more expensive products in Moldova because of more costly energy 
product inputs (e.g. agricultural products,  etc.) as well as bigger indirect costs 
(transportation, heating production facilities, labour due to high living expenses, 
etc.). As a result the overall competitiveness of Moldovan goods will be put under 
stress. The strategy for the newly-elected Government should be two-pronged: 
it should focus on diversifi cation of the energy supply and domestic production 
with special focus on renewable sources of energy; it should revive the eﬀ orts at 
increasing energy eﬃ  ciency in order to modernize existing buildings and equipment 
and set more rigorous standards for the future ones;
As it was mentioned in the previous MEGA issue the orderly gas supply may again be 
imperilled this winter as “gas tussle” between Russia and Ukraine may re-emerge, 
while election environment in Ukraine in that period may prove fertile ground for 
the confl icts of this sort. The new Government should put forward an “emergency 
plan” for such a situation or risk facing up the consequences;
?
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The more expensive food is about to stay with us for some more time, at least. 
Due to the fact that Moldova became a net importer of food some time ago only 
magnifi es the dangers stemming from more expensive food especially when the 
incomes of households are severely hit by the economic crisis. However, given 
important agricultural potential of Moldova our country has chances to transform 
these risks in awesome opportunities. In this sense the new Government should 
turn to important sector reforms which are long overdue. Speeding up the 
implementation of the sanitary safety standards required by the EU-Moldova action 
plan will the fi rst important test in this respect. While another important venue for 
eﬀ orts should be de-monopolisation of local agricultural market, cutting red tape, 
streamlining the intermediary structures and allowing domestic producers to earn 
fairer profi ts.
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Who we are
EXPERT-GRUP is a leading economic and social research centre in Republic of Moldova and a 
member of the PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) network comprising 39 policy 
think-tanks in 27 countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Our mission
The institutional mission of the Expert-Grup is to contribute to the economic, democratic and 
social development as well as support the international competitive enhancement of the Republic 
of Moldova. We tend to accomplish this mission by employing skilful researchers, delivering top 
quality services and promoting eﬃ  cient, transparent and innovative models for economic and 
social policies.
Main institutional objectives
Provide the public with relevant and most up-to-date analysis on economic and 
social trends;
Oﬀ er assistance in the decision-making and policy-making processes; 
Promote innovative development and policy models.
Areas of expertise
Development strategies;
Macroeconomics and economic systems;
Global economy and international economic relations;
Economy of the European integration;
Monetary and fi scal policies;
Labour economy, management and business culture;
Consumer behaviour;
Industrial and agricultural economics;
Economy of health and education.
Contact details
Address: MD-2012, Columna str., 133, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova; 
Telephone: +37322 93-00-14, +37322 21-15-99, fax +37322 21-15-99;
e-mail: info@expert-grup.org, web: www.expert-grup.org.
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